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Summary
Credit risk researchers have mainly focused on the area of wholesale and corporate
loans. Modern commercial credit risk models are also built on the assumptions that
are only applicable to corporate risk environment. There are little existing credit risk
models that can be applied directly to consumer credit risk areas such as consumer
loan portfolio credit losses forecast and customer default behavior prediction.
The objective of my thesis is to contribute to the literature by introducing models
that are accordant with consumer credit risk characteristics. Unprecedentedly, we
bring concepts and terminologies used by credit card industry, such as buckets and
credit card account structures which are core components of risk control procedures
in consumer credit area, into credit risk modeling. First, the modeling started from a
simple scenario of binary response (pay/default) of a obligator over single time period.
Next, we propose a portfolio credit risk model combining bucket strategy with logit
models and then compared it with the traditional portfolio risk models introduced by
Vasicek and implied by the Basel II Accord. Finally, a new model that can account
for multi-layer of associations among credit card accounts is proposed. Built on data-
structure assumptions that are of business intuition, the proposed models outperform
the traditional models based on only academic sense.
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Introduction
In the last three decades, with the progress of IT technology, in world wide banks are
unprecedentedly capable of processing huge volume of data. During their daily oper-
ations, banks collect customers’ demographic and behavioral data from every touch
points that interact with customers (e.g. through customer acquisitions, branches,
ATM machines, internet banking, etc.). The information is then organized and stored
in data structures that are in line with business intuition and banks’ intelligence. On
one hand, those banks that don’t analyze the data to look for patterns useful for
optimizing business objects are losing one of their most valuable assets. On the other
hand, academic and regulatory statistical models that do not properly account for
data structures rooted in business intuition and banks’ intelligence are very likely to
be less relevant and sometimes even misleading. This is a thought that dominates me
in the course of moving this thesis forward.
The consumer lending market covers a large number of products, including mort-
gages, auto-loans, credit cards, debit cards, etc. Among these products, credit card
market is one of the most rapidly growing markets in Singapore, in terms of both mon-
etary significance and the number of people involved. From Table 1, it is seen that
Singapore credit card annual transaction amount has increased on average by 16% in
1
2past five years and reached Singapore Dollar (S$) 25.66 billion in 2008. The number
of people who have access to credit card usage also increased dramatically. Number
of credit card facilities grows to 6.6 million (includes supplementary cards), higher
by 67.8% in last five years, in comparison to a 19.7% incremental in total population
during the same period. Another characteristic of the credit card market is more
intensive competition within the market. Based on the population of Singapore as of
2009 and the total number of credit card plastics shown in the Table 1, on average a
local resident of Singapore has 1.3 credit card plastics in his/her wallet. Given such a
saturated market, credit card issuing banks, competing for larger market shares, are
inevitably expanding their new acquisitions to those used to be excluded from owning
credit cards (usually the population with lower income and less credibility). Not to
mention, this expansion happens under a more turbulent and unpredictable global
economic climate of today. Residing in an increasingly complicated market and with
growing financial significance, credit card business and the credit risk associated with
it are attracting greater than ever attention from banks and regulators. There is a
rising demand for mathematical and statistical models that specialized in credit cards
in order to properly analyze and forecast performance of credit card portfolios.
As of recent, consumer credit risk literature is broadly classified into two groups.
The first group is largely motivated and driven by the release of a consultative pa-
per (A new capital adequacy framework , 1999) by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS henceforth) for internal banks capital ratio benchmarks. Intrin-
sically, the main focus of the new Basel proposal is not for consumer lending port-
folio but rather mainly for wholesale and corporate portfolios. In addition, popular
1Source of data: Monetary Authority of Singapore, Monthly Statistical Bulletin
3Table 1: Singapore Credit Card Statistics
Period Number of Cards Total Card Rollover Charge-off 1
Main Supplementary Billings (S$Mil.) Balance (S$Mil.) Rates (%)
2004 2,985,973 946,784 14,047 2,641 7.6
2005 3,415,507 1,026,516 16,073 2,842 5.0
2006 3,968,044 1,121,932 18,640 2,822 4.4
2007 4,472,124 1,173,988 22,640 2,979 3.9
2008 5,056,450 1,221,333 25,662 3,379 3.6
2009 Jan 5,078,770 1,226,593 1,989 3,440
2009 Feb 5,097,939 1,231,046 1,784 3,508
2009 Mar 5,123,931 1,234,111 2,038 3,340 4.6
2009 Apr 5,156,519 1,230,370 1,953 3,398
2009 May 5,186,062 1,242,738 1,999 3,455
2009 Jun 5,230,856 1,249,206 2,214 3,499 5.8
2009 Jul 5,273,102 1,258,057 2,133 3,443
2009 Aug 5,297,630 1,261,049 2,170 3,499
2009 Sep 5,353,195 1,268,326 2,287 3,618 5.7
2009 Oct 5,332,990 1,264,523 2,343 3,605
4commercial techniques, like CreditMetrics (Gupton, Finger, & Bhatia, 1997), Cred-
itRisk+ (CreditRisk+: A Credit Risk Management Framework , 1997) and Moody’s
KMV (Kealhofer, 1995), are not specially designed for consumer lending portfolios
as well. This has raised concerns to many practitioners and researchers in the area
of consumer lending. These concerns were voiced out in the Journal of Banking &
Finance 2004 special issue (“Retail credit risk management and measurement: An
introduction to the special issue”, 2004). Separately, Andrade and Thomas (2004)
proposed a theory for consumer default. Using certain assumptions, they provided a
option-based reasoning for process of default in consumer credit. Andrade and Sicsu´
(2007) proposed a model to generate the distribution of a portfolio default rate by
Monte Carlo simulation.
However, since then not much research in consumer portfolio credit risk have
been done. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we contribute to this genre by introducing a
new consumer portfolio credit risk model, which employs the bucket concept used in
credit control procedures of credit card industry. It is shown that the proposed model
can provide more accurate and more economically meaningful forecast on credit loss
than the traditional credit risk models based on wholesale and corporate credit risk
theories.
The second set of literature on consumer credit risk focuses on developing sta-
tistical tools to monitor customer performance, characterize behavior patterns and
identify bad risks. A thorough review on these statistical methods can be found in
Hand (2001). In existing statistical methods, basic unit of analysis is usually consid-
ered as individual loan account. Thus, association among accounts owned by single
5customer is ignored. Moreover, these methods do not monitor customers’ evolvement
over time. So valuable information such as inter-account correlation, autocorrelated
behavior or macro-economic impact on a cohort is washed out. In Chapter 3 of
this thesis, we engrafted the logic that credit card issuing banks used to build data
structure for credit card management and the hierarchical models popular in biomed-
ical and educational studies to develop a new credit risk model that can account for
multiple layers of association among credit card loans.
Credit cards have evolved over the last forty years as one of the most accepted,
convenient, and profitable financial products and play an important role in the strate-
gic plans of many banks. This thesis is inspired by credit control procedures adopted
by these banks. Their way of designing products, payment structures and portfolio
segmentation haven’t been put under scrutiny and thus interesting finding may lie in-
side. On the business requirement side, a meaningful, easy-to-implement and precise
credit risk model will come in handy for banks’ risk assessment and strategic planing.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, credit card risk modeling begins
in a scenario of binary responses of one time period - roll-forward 2 of a credit card
account vs other outcomes. The objective of this chapter is three-fold: Firstly, it
introduces statistical tools that are needed to analyze credit risk within a context of
credit card risk control procedures of issuing banks. Secondly, using real credit card
data, this chapter reveals the necessity of segmentation by buckets (days past due)
and the advantage of including random effect in modeling credit card risk. Thirdly,
it proposes the use of MCMC method in credit card risk modeling, especially when
complicated models are required to address intricate sources of variance in data. In
2Please refer to the Appendix A for terminology and abbreviations used in this thesis.
6Chapter 2, a new credit risk model for credit cards portfolio is introduced, which
leverages on the systematic and distinctive payment structure of unsecured consumer
loans, such as buckets payment structure of credit card products, in order to simulate
portfolio credit loss in a more realistic way. To prove the effectiveness of the new
model, I compare the credit loss implied by the model with that implied by Basel’s
model in the same chapter with encouraging findings from the simulation results.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I develop a credit risk model that can account for multiple
layers of association among credit card loans based on the hierarchical models from
biomedical and educational literature. Applying to a real credit card portfolio, the
proposed model shows great advantages over other four reference models discussed in
the same chapter. This chapter highlights that without proper assumptions on the
various correlations root in data structures, credit scoring models may be less relevant
and sometimes misleading.
Chapter 1
Credit Risk Model of Binary
Response
In this chapter an introduction to statistical methods dealing with discrete responses
is given. These methods are useful in credit risk studies because that debt obligers’
decision making under various credit conditions is normally summarized as limited
repayment options, e.g. full payment, partial payment or default. These options can
be conveniently represented as discrete numeric values such as 0, 1, 2, etc, which
is suitably modeled by discrete response models. Establishing foundation of many
possible extension, this chapter focuses on binary responses models in credit risk
context. Specifically, we will introduce binary response models from both classical
and Bayesian perspectives. These statistical methods are also applied in later chapters
of this thesis to model consumer credit risks under complex scenarios. This chapter
provides an analysis on a real credit card dataset from a credit card issuing bank. It
proposes that credit risk modeling of credit card accounts should be based on segments
by number of days past due (or buckets), considering distinct characteristics and risk
profiles of these segments. It also demonstrates that Bayesian method exceeds MLE
method in flexibility by implementing both methods into the real dataset.
7
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1.1 Introduction
Binary response models are common both in social science studies (such as survey
analysis and observational studies) and in research on credit risk. To help visualize
binary response model in the context of credit risk, we give here a short example here.
Let’s suppose that a borrower is randomly picked up from a bank’s credit card port-
folio. What is the probability that the selected customer will default on his/her due
amount? To answer this question, one might infer from the historical default rate of
the whole portfolio. However, by including the borrower’s individual characteristics
into inference, the estimation for the probability of default can be refined substan-
tially. Then the next question is how to find a way to link the probability of default
of a borrower to his individual characteristics represented by a list of explanatory
variables.
Suppose that yi denotes the default status of the ith borrower and restrict states






1 if borrower i becomes default
0 otherwise
(1.1)
The probability of the ith borrower will default is denoted by pi, or equivalently,
Prob(yi = 1) = pi. The characteristics that are used to predict the outcome of the
binary variable yi are referred to as explanatory variables, or covariates, denoted by
xi. The function that relates explanatory variables to the probability of default is
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named link function and expressed as
ηi = β
′xi = g(pi), (1.2)
where ηi is a linear equation of covariates xi and g(.) is the link function. One of
the commonly used link functions is the logit function (the inverse of the ”logistic”
function used in mathematics). This function has a simple form and allows us to







Equivalently, the Equation (1.3) can be expressed as a function of the probability











= F (β′xi), (1.4)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the logistic distri-
bution. Another popular choice for the link function is the standard normal CDF,
denoted by Φ. Binary response models that employ this link function are called probit
models. The rest of this study focus only on these two link functions.
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Grouping bernoulli observations by common covariate values, we reach the likeli-




pyii (1− pi)ni−yi, (1.5)
where ni is the number of binary observations in covariate group i and yi is the
observed binomial count in the ith observation taking values between 0, 1, . . . , ni.
Note that ni = 1 results in a special case of the binomial regression models, called
ungrouped data model.
In this chapter, we described steps involved in building a default probability model.
Specifically, Section 1.2.1 illustrates how credit card default dataset is fitted to the
binary responses model by using the classical Maximum Likelihood Method. And
in Section 1.2.2 the Bayesian method is introduced as an alternative to the classical
method bringing in much more flexibility in inference and interpretation of the the
model. The data used in this study is described in Section 1.3. Finally, the estimation
results are discussed in Section 1.3 as well.
1.2 Estimation Methods
1.2.1 An Algorithm for Fitting Binary Response Model
Due to difficulty in obtaining an analytic expression for the maximum likelihood
estimates of the Equation (1.4), it is a common practice to follow the iteratively
reweighted least squares (IRLS) algorithm introduced by McCullagh and Nelder
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(1989). Based on Newton-Raphson function maximization, IRLS can offer users a
easy way to fit binary response models at a time when computational resources were
scarce.
In this process the dependent variable is not yi but zi, a linearized form of the link
function applied to yi. IRLS proceeds by regressing zi on the regression model β
′x,
using a weight matrix W, which are functions of the fitted values pˆi. The adjusted
dependent variables zi is given as
zi = ηi + (yi − nipi) dηi
nidpi
, (1.6)
where ηi is the current value of the linear predictor β
′xi. The weight matrix is a






pi(1− pi) . (1.7)
The iterative process consists of the following steps:
1. Initialize the regression parameters βˆ with appropriate values.
2. Compute the linear predictor ηˆi = β
′xi and the fitted probability pˆi = F (ηˆi).
3. Compute the derivative of the link function, dpi/dηi = dF (ηi)/dηi.
4. Compute the adjusted dependent variable z.
5. Compute the weight matrix W.
6. Run a regression to get updated value of parameters as βˆ = (X ′WX)−1X ′Wz.
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7. Repeat steps 1 to 6 until changes to the estimated regression coefficient βˆ and
the log likelihood are sufficiently small.
After the completion of iterative process, that is when convergence happens, βˆ are
taken as the maximum likelihood estimators of the regression coefficients. (X ′WX)−1
represents the asymptotic covariance matrix. Another output is the vector pˆ =
[p1, p2, · · · , pN ]′ containing the fitted probabilities of default for all yi.
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1.2.2 Bayesian Estimation for Binary Response Model
The classical approach described above for a binary response model uses maximum
likelihood method, which is easy to implement and efficient in computation, though,
with some limitations. Two limitations are widely known among statisticians. Firstly,
MLE inferences are dependent on associated asymptotic theory. In real application,
e.g. for small sample size, the accuracy of estimators under classical assumptions is
questionable. Secondly, in generalized linear model, variance is defined as a product
of a variance function (a function with respect to mean) and a dispersion parameter
φ. If it is assumed that the data follow binomial distribution (e.g. in the logit model),
the dispersion parameter is equal to 1. However, there are occasions where it is found
that data can be better described with a dispersion parameter φ 6= 1. These cases are
called as over-dispersed (under-dispersed) when φ > 1 (φ < 1). When binary response
model need to be generalized to cope with over- or under- dispersion of binomial data,
MLE method cannot provide an easy estimate of the dispersion parameter, whereas
the same can be easily modeled as a random effect factor in Bayesian context. We
illustrate this point by comparing the standard logit model and the random effect logit
model in Section 1.3. In short, there are obvious advantages for using the Bayesian
approach, however MLE estimators are poised to be a good prior knowledge source
for Bayesian estimation.





where θ are model parameters; c(y) is a normalization constant which ensures that
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g(θ|y) is a probability density such that ∫ g(θ|y)dθ = 1 , and g(θ) is called prior
beliefs.
In Bayesian statistics, a common question encountered by statisticians is to make
inference on a function h(θ) of model parameters θ, which involves the need of eval-







For example, the marginal posterior density, a special case of h(θ), is often of interest
and needs to be evaluated as integral
g(θi|y) =
∫
g(θ|y)dθ1 · · · θi−1θi+1 · · · θk. (1.10)
To evaluate integrals of the Equation (1.9), Bayesian statisticians usually use simu-






where θ(1), . . . , θ(m) is an independent sequence of random variables drawn from the
posterior distribution g(θ|y). Therefore, methods for simulating random variables
θ(1), . . . , θ(m) from the posterior distribution are of great importance in Bayesian
statistics. When the posterior distribution has familiar form, we can generate random
variables directly from random number generators of various existing statistical soft-
ware packages. However, when posterior distribution doesn’t have a familiar form, we
have to resort to a class of algorithms, called Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC).
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MCMC is essentially an algorithm to recursively sample from conditional prob-
ability density f(θ(j)|θ(j−1)) such that the distribution of each iteration in the se-
quence of sampled values, θ(j), converge to the true posterior distribution as j be-
comes large. One of the most popular methods of MCMC algorithm is called Gibbs
sampler (Gelfand and Smith (1990)(Gelfand & Smith, 1990)), which employs the
strategy of iteratively sampling from conditional posterior densities. Assuming there
are r parameters in a model, θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θr), Gibbs sampler involves iteratively
sampling as described in the following steps:
• Generate θj1 from f1(θ1|θj−12 , . . . , θj−1r , data).
• Generate θj2 from f1(θ2|θj1, θj−13 , . . . , θj−1r , data).
• ...
• Generate θjr from f1(θr|θj1, θj2, . . . , θjr−1, data).
These steps are repeated until the random variate θ(j) will converge to the posterior
distribution of interest. Usually approximate convergence occurs after reasonable
number of iterations. Because of the factor that the MCMC chain are initiated with
values not drawn from the posterior distribution, people usually drop the simulated
values before the convergence has been reached. The length of the dropped chains is
called burn-in period.
We next introduce the MCMC estimation method for binary response model.
Here we follow the notation used by Johnson and Albert(1999) (Johnson & Albert,
1999). Suppose that there is a latent variable Zi to decide the default probability for
a borrower i and expressed as
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Zi = β
′xi + ǫi, (1.12)
where ǫi is independent and identically distributed according to link function F cho-




0 if Zi ≤ 0
1 if Zi > 0.
(1.13)
That is, borrower i defaults if and only if Zi > 0. With the introduction of the latent
variable, there is a convenient way to implement Gibbs sampling for binary response
model. Take the probit model as an example. The conditional distribution of β based
on Z is
β ∼ N((X ′X)−1X ′Z, (X ′X)−1), (1.14)
which is derived from least square estimate of β. Similarly, given β and data, the




φ(z;β′xi, 1)I(z ≤ 0) if yi = 0
φ(z;β′xi, 1)I(z > 0) if yi = 1,
, (1.15)
where φ(·; a, b) denotes a normal density with mean a and variance b and I(·) is the
indicator function. Hence, the Gibbs sampling algorithm for sampling m iterates
from the posterior density of a binary response model assuming a uniform prior can
be summarized as follows:
1. Make j = 0 and set initial values β(0).
2. Increase the value of j by 1, j = j + 1.
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3. Following the Equation (1.15), the latent variable Z
(j)
i can be sampled as follows.
If yi = 0, simulate latent variables Z
(j)
i from the truncated normal distribution
φ(z;β(j−1)xi, 1)I(z ≤ 0);
If yi = 1, simulate latent variables Z
(j)
i from the truncated normal distribution
φ(z;β(j−1)xi, 1)I(z > 0).
4. Simulate β(j) ∼ N((X ′X)−1X ′Z(j), (X ′X)−1).
5. If j < m, return to the step 2.
In the next section, both the IRLS and Bayesian methods are used to estimate a
binary response model using a dataset on credit card cardholders’s payment records
of a typical consumer bank.
CHAPTER 1. CREDIT RISK MODEL OF BINARY RESPONSE 18
1.3 Implementation with Real Data
The data set used in this study is provided by a representative credit card issuing
bank. The data set consists of credit card accounts randomly sampled from the
bank’s database (there are 40595 accounts in total and they are dispersed in different
months and segments)1. Each credit card account is assigned to a segment based
on its days past due (or DPD in short) in a particular month. These segments are
also called buckets and conventionally classified as M0-M6 buckets (see definitions
in Table 1.1). Distribution of all sampled accounts across different buckets is also
reported in the Table 1.1. It is shown that there are much fewer accounts residing
in M2, M3,· · · ,M6 buckets (denoted by M2+ buckets henceforth) than in M0-M1
buckets. TheM2+ buckets containing accounts late for more than 30 days, which are
generally considered as groups of sever delinquency. The ratio of number (outstanding
balance) of accounts in the M2+ buckets over total number (outstanding balance)
of accounts in a credit card portfolio is called 30+ ratio, one of the most important
measures of portfolio credit risk used by industry practitioners and regulators.
Table 1.1: Buckets and Distribution of Credit Card Accounts
Bucket Days Past Due No. of Records
M0 0 DPD 35,695
M1 1 - 29 DPD 4,200
M2 30 - 59 DPD 323
M3 60 - 89 DPD 148
M4 90 - 119 DPD 98
M5 120 - 149 DPD 71
M6 150 - 179 DPD 60
1The data are supposed to represent wide spectrum of credit card accounts rather than to match
the actual portfolio of any real-world credit card company
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The Table 1.1 arranges all buckets from top to bottom with incremental DPD
but decreasing number of accounts, resembling a waterfall in appearance. Indeed,
the movement of accounts among buckets can be figuratively imagined as waterfall
- an account will flow from its existing bucket to the next bucket (roll forward) if
payments made (between last billing date and the payment due date) are not enough
to cover the minimum due amount; otherwise, the account will not roll forward. A
detailed description on accounts’ movement among buckets can be found in Section
2.2 of the Chapter 2.
The above introduced data were provided in a raw format. It is necessary to
transform them to adapt to the binary response model setup. Firstly, a credit card




0 if the i-th account doesn’t roll forward;
1 if the i-th account rolls forward.
(1.16)
Upon the above simplification, accounts’ actual movement thus can be treated as
binary responses and modeled through the logit and probit models introduced in the
Section 1.1.
Secondly, we divide all accounts into three groups - M0, M1 and M2+ - each
group is to be estimated separately. This is due to distinct characteristics and risk
profiles of these groups. For example, performance of a bucket is usually measured
by roll-forward rate, which is defined as percentage of roll-forward accounts of the
bucket in a month. We found that M2+ buckets show similarly high roll-forward
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rates 2, suggesting they have very different characteristics from the M0 and M1
buckets. This finding is intuitive - majority of M1 accounts are delinquent due to
cardholders’ negligence for not making payment, while M2+ accounts are delinquent
most probably due to cardholders’ inability and unwillingness to pay. We groupM2+
accounts together for estimation also because that: 1) given good representation
to different segments, it is always preferred to have minimum number of models
to be estimated; and 2) there are too few accounts in later buckets (for example
there are only 60 accounts in the M6 buckets), therefor combining M2+ buckets
counteracts the disadvantage of small sample size. As a result, for all accounts, we
use subscripts k = 1, 2, 3, representing buckets M0, M1 and M2+ respectively, to
denote the segments accounts currently locate in.
Next, we look at explanatory variables used in the model. Two key performance
indicators (KPI) are picked up from the raw data in order to predict the probability
that the i-th account will roll forward in one-month period: number of times the
account was delinquent in last 12 months (X12M) and ratio of recent delinquent
times to life-time delinquent times (RCNT ). The former measures accounts’ past 12
months performance - for how many months out of last 12 months delinquency occurs.
The later measures how severe the recent delinquency is, in comparison to account’s
long term performance. These two variables are chosen due to the following reasons:
1) frequency of delinquency in recent period (usually 6-12 months) is weighed heavily
by banks when conducting credit evaluations (Avery, Calem, & Canner, 2003); 2)
varying significance of these two KPIs across the M0, M1 and M2+ models provide
2Actual roll-forward rates across buckets carry very sensitive information of issuing banks’ port-
folio performance and thus are not given here.
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an ideal manifestation of how distinct these three segments are. We will elaborate on
this point during the description of the empirical results later.
Lastly, to speed up estimation without losing much information, we de-mean and
classify these KPIs into grids. For example, X12M , centered around mean 0, is binned
into value ranges “<= −2”, “-1”,· · · ,“3” and “>= 4”, indicating frequency of recent
delinquency of a single account in relation to the average frequency of delinquency
in the portfolio. The total 40595 accounts in the sample are grouped into N = 89
groups based on different combinations of KPI grids and buckets. In each group i,
ni is the total number of accounts inside the group. After grouping, yi no longer
takes value from {0, 1} or indicates outcome of a single account. Instead, yi denotes
number of accounts out of the total number ni of the group i that roll forward. Note
that un-grouped data is just a special case of grouped data when ni = 1.
The model equations are thus specified as follows:
yi ∼ binomial(pi, ni),
Logit(pi) = β0k(i) + β1k(i)X12M + β2k(i)RCNT, (1.17)
where i = 1 . . . N and k(i) represents the bucket of the group i and takes value from
{1, 2, 3}, representing M0, M1 and M2+ buckets respectively.
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.2 for both the IRLS (MLE) and
the MCMC (Bayesian) methods introduced in the previous section. The intercept
parameters β01, β02 and β03 are estimated as -2.67, -2.70 and 0.26, respectively forM0,
M1 and M2+ buckets. As shown by the Equation (1.17), these intercept parameters
suggest that accounts residing in M2+ buckets on average have higher probability
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of roll-forward than those in M0 and M1 buckets. The estimates for β11 (0.61), β12
(0.10) and β13 (0.12) indicate that the estimated slope representing the relationship
between X12M and probability of roll-forward is a whole lot more significant in the
M0 bucket than in other buckets. This is also intuitive. Majority of M0 accounts
seldom move into delinquent buckets, thus frequent delinquency of an account in
recent period is a good indicator of the account’s future delinquency. On the other
hand, for accounts already residing in delinquent buckets, X12M is naturally high
for all accounts. Moderate differences in X12M can provide few useful information
to predict whether a delinquent account will roll forward.
Table 1.2: Estimation Results using IRLS and MCMC
IRLS MCMC
Standard Wald Standard
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Prob>Chi-Sq Estimate Error 2.50% 97.50%
M0
β01 -2.67 0.02 12647.59 0.00 -2.67 0.02 -2.72 -2.63
β11 0.61 0.01 2243.85 0.00 0.61 0.01 0.58 0.63
β12 0.01 0.01 1.62 0.20 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03
M1
β02 -2.70 0.06 1748.94 0.00 -2.7 0.07 -2.83 -2.58
β12 0.10 0.03 12.09 0.00 0.1 0.03 0.04 0.16
β22 0.09 0.03 11.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.14
M2+
β03 0.26 0.08 10.31 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.1 0.42
β13 0.12 0.04 10.94 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.19
β23 0.16 0.03 21.11 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.23
As compared to the decreasing predictive ability of X12M in buckets from M0 to
M2+, the empirical finding on RCNT is on the other way around. The estimates for
β21 (0.01; and statistically not different from 0), β22 (0.09) and β23 (0.16) indicate that
RCNT is a good indicator of roll-forward in delinquent buckets, especially for M2+
buckets. The rationality is that accounts in delinquent buckets with high RCNT are
those with good / short performance history in the past but deteriorate suddenly
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in recent period. Thus RCNT is able to differentiate suddenly stressed cardholders
from habitually delinquent cardholders. Suddenly stressed cardholders are usually
those encounter unexpected financial problems and have very high probability of roll-
forward. From the above estimates, it is shown that M0, M1 and M2+ buckets
have very different characteristics - M2+ accounts are summarized as those with
high propensity of roll-forward, and the probability of roll-forward is very sensitive
to recent deterioration given their long term performance; M0 accounts have much
lower probability of roll-forward, which is sensitive to frequency of delinquency within
last 12 month; M1 accounts share characteristics of the above two in a mixed-up way.
For both the MLE and Bayesian methods, the Table 1.2 the estimates are al-
most identical with minor differences on standard errors. Unlike IRLS method which
only provides point estimates, MCMC method generates posterior distribution for
the estimated parameters. For example, with Bayesian method we know not only
the estimated mean of β11 (0.61) but also the estimates of median and any other
percentiles (e.g. the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles) from the posterior distribution of β11.
This makes parameter inference a whole lot more easier and flexible. Another ad-
vantage of having full probability distribution of estimates is that estimates may not
be symmetrically distributed, which provides additional information on top of the
estimated mean and standard error.
Moreover, when model structure becomes complex, IRLS becomes very difficult to
implement if not inapplicable at all. We provide such a scenario here. As mentioned
at the beginning of the Subsection 1.2.2, logit model that takes in random effect in
addition to its fixed part is able to explain additional variability (over-dispersion)
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in the data over that specified by the fixed effects in the model. With Bayesian
method, we can extent the Equation (1.17) into a model including both fixed effects
and random effect as follows:
yi ∼ binomial(pi, ni),
Logit(pi) = β0k(i) + β1k(i)X12M + β2k(i)RCNT + ǫi, (1.18)
where the only difference as compared to the Equation (1.18) is the introduction of
normally distributed random effect ǫi ∼ N(0, σ2). Estimation results of the random
effect model are reported in Table 1.3, along with the results of the standard logit
model. There is hardly any significant change on the results from the two models,
except that the newly included random effect variance σ2 is significant.
Table 1.3: Estimation Results with and without Random Effects
Model with Random Effects Model with Random Effects
Standard Percentile Standard Percentile
Parameter Estimate Error 2.50% 97.50% Estimate Error 2.50% 97.50%
M0
β01 -2.48 0.09 -2.66 -2.30 -2.67 0.02 -2.72 -2.63
β11 0.57 0.03 0.50 0.64 0.61 0.01 0.58 0.63
β21 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03
M1
β02 -2.73 0.08 -2.88 -2.57 -2.7 0.07 -2.83 -2.58
β12 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.1 0.03 0.04 0.16
β22 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.14
M2+
β03 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.49 0.26 0.08 0.1 0.42
β13 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.19
β23 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.23
σ 0.21 0.04 0.14 0.31
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However, the random effect model fits the data much better, which can be shown
through an analysis named Bayesian residual analysis. Because that the observed
probability of roll-forward for each group is given as pˆi =
yi
ni
and the fitted probability
is from the Equation (1.4), we can derive the Bayesian residuals as follows:
ri = pˆi − pi = yi
ni
− F (β′xi). (1.19)
Although the analytical form of ri is unknown, noting that the only random quantity
in the Equation (1.19) is β, we can obtain histogram estimate of it’s distribution
through a MCMC sample from the posterior distribution of the parameter β. Good-
ness of fit is measured as whether the residual is statistically different from 0. Unlike
residual analysis within the context of MLE, Bayesian residual analysis works without
resorting to asymptotic theory and thus is free from the problem of small ni. Espe-
cially when ni reduces to 1 - binomial observations become Bernoulli observation,
Bayesian residual analysis become the only method appropriate.
To see that the random effect model outperforms the model considering only fixed
effects for the credit card dataset, we randomly take out the groups 1, 10 and 20 from
the grouped sample and estimate their distributions of Bayesian residuals under the
two models. The results are reported in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Bayesian Residual Distributions of the Random Effect Model and the
Fixed Effects Model
Bayesian residual dist. i = 1 i = 10 i = 20
Random effect model Fixed effects model Random effect model Fixed effects model Random effect model Fixed effects model
2.5 Percentile -0.0017 0.0025 -0.0396 -0.0483 -0.0455 0.0277
Median 0.0005 0.0047 -0.0054 -0.0399 0.0041 0.0457
97.5 Percentile 0.0028 0.0069 0.0303 -0.0313 0.0572 0.0642
Using the random effect model, the estimated Bayesian residuals include 0 within
their 2.5-97.5 percentile ranges for all the sampled groups i = 1, 10, 20. But this is
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not the case for the fixed effects model, suggesting those Bayesian residuals from the
model are statistically different from 0.
As shown above, Bayesian residual analysis can provide goodness of fit information
at group level, which is very useful in case studies or in the process of identifying
outliers from data. But it cannot summarize the goodness of fit into a single value such
that one can prefer one model over the other by simply comparing the summarized
values. Bayesian statisticians developed such a model selection criterion, named DIC
(Deviance Information Criterion). Based on the crierion, the model results in the
lower DIC will be the preferred model. Although the technical details of DIC will be
introduced later in the Chapter 3, we report in Table 1.5 the DIC values from the
random effect model and the fixed effects model to conclude the benefit of introducing
the random effect model (or more complex models if necessary) into the credit card
data and the success and potential of the Bayesian method in dealing with these
complex models. However, MLE method always serves a useful base when modelers
have no clue on MCMC initial values.
Table 1.5: Comparison of the Two Models by DIC
D PD DIC= D + PD
Random effect model 447.38 34.51 481.90
Fixed effect model 553.09 9.03 562.12
1.4 Conclusion
Providing introductions to two competing estimation methods for binary response
model and an implementation of binary response model in a credit card accounts
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dataset, Chapter 1 aims to setup framework for consumer credit risks topics that
will be discussed in later chapters. The two distinct statistical methods introduced
in the chapter are IRLS (MLE) and MCMC (Bayesian). It is shown that for simple
linear model 3 the two methods are very similar in results despite they are based on
two distinct statistical theories. However, this chapter demonstrates that the MCMC
method (Bayesian method), characterized by its ability to make flexible inference and
its advantages in handling complicated models, is much more successful than the MLE
method when applied to dataset involving intricate sources of variance. As proposed
by the Chapter 1, MCMC is heavily relied on in the Chapter 3 of this thesis.
3Intrinsically binary response model is nonlinear, but in this thesis we call it simple linear model
in that the model is linear in terms of the latent variable, see the Equation (1.12).
Chapter 2
Bucket Strategy and Credit Card
Credit Risk
The aim of this chapter is to develop a credit risk model for credit cards portfolios
managed by consumer banks. From credit operations’ perspective, the proposed
model is intended to provide a flexible and accurate instrument to assess the quality
of customers and forecast possible credit losses of a credit cards portfolio, which take
both non-delinquent and delinquent customers into consideration. Noting that the
widely accepted bucket strategy in credit cards industry gives a unique structure
other than general settings used by various existing portfolio credit risk models, we
focus mainly on how to close the conceptual gap between credit risk models in the
literature and business requirement from credit cards industry. We also compare the
credit losses calculated based on Basel II capital requirement formula for consumer
credit with that derived from our model.
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2.1 Introduction
Within the last two decades, a number of advances have been made for the mea-
surement of credit risk in portfolios of commercial loans, bonds or other instruments.
Some well-known examples are CreditMetrics (Gupton et al., 1997), CreditRisk+
(CreditRisk+: A Credit Risk Management Framework , 1997) and Moody’s KMV
(Kealhofer, 1995), which have quickly become influential benchmarks after being re-
leased to public. Although these models are presented within rather different mathe-
matical frameworks, several comparative studies have shown that they can be mapped
into a common mathematical form - at least when attention is restricted to default
losses, after excluding market-to-market movements on non-defaulted claims. Addi-
tionally, it is prevalent to recognize Merton’s paper (Merton, 1974) on corporate asset
valuation have served as the theoretical foundation for the development of most of
the above models (except CreditRisk+ which is based on actuarial approach found
in the property insurance literature). However application of these models in retail
and specially in credit cards portfolio is more of a challenge - the building blocks of
a corporate portfolio are comprised of shares of stocks or bonds of publicly traded
and priced corporations that can be symbolized as random numbers and stochas-
tic processes, whereas the building blocks of retail credit portfolio are the loans of
individuals with personal preference and behaviorial patterns.
In the approach of corporate credit risk models, the stochastic behavior of the
value of a firm’s assets is modeled and if the value becomes lower than a threshold,
usually a portion of the firm’s debt value, the company is considered to be in default.
On the other hand, in retail credit settings, it is difficult to measure a consumer’s
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assets nor is it necessarily the case that default occurs when a consumers’ debts exceed
their assets. These drawbacks were also pointed out in Allen, Delong and Saunders’
survey in 2004.
Not as eye-catching as their cooperate counterpart, recently some efforts have
been made in modeling retail credit risk. Jacobson and Rozbach (2003) proposed a
method to calculate portfolio credit risk based on an unbiased bivariate probit credit-
scoring method. Perli and Nayda (2004) presented two internal capital allocation
models and compared the capital ratios they generated with those prescribed by the
Basel’s New Capital Accord proposal for advanced retail portfolios. By establishing
a theory of default for consumers that allows an option based approach (in a similar
way that is used in corporate credit), Andrade and Sicsu´ (2007) proposed a model
to generate the distribution of a portfolio default rate by Monte Carlo simulation.
There are some common features in the research mentioned above. The authors
first estimated an individual credit risk model to predict whether an individual bor-
rower in the end of a time horizon will go default (or survive till the end of the period).
In the second step, due to complexity of their models, they will normally choose to
calculate a VaR measure for the sample portfolio of loans by means of Monte-Carlo
simulation. It is also worth noting that they usually setup a binary choice for each
individual borrower, default or not default, within a pre-defined time period, say 12
months. However, whether an account is performing or not within the fixed period is
not important as long as the account’s credit worthiness falls below a certain threshold
the default of the account occurs. Due to the high diversifiability of retail portfolios,
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS henceforth) allows future margin
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income to be used to cover credit losses before a bank uses its capital. Hence it is
critical that payment behavior of each cardholder in a portfolio needs to be accounted
for by credit risk model so that card issuer can assess a portfolio’s economic losses
accurately (the difference between tail credit losses and projected income over the
same period) rather than credit losses. Unfortunately, the existing models are not
able to accurately calculate future margin income as they ignore movements of loan
accounts among delinquency buckets and thus the associated payment information
within the time horizonal.
Credit cards have evolved over the last thirty years into one of the most accepted,
convenient, and profitable financial products and are of importance in the strategic
plans of many banks. Usually, credit card issuing banks are directly involved in the
credit card business and therefore own credit risk from these exposures. This chapter
proposes a credit risk model based on the bucket strategy employed by credit card
issuers to manage credit cards portfolio. The proposed model is inspired by credit
control procedures of credit operations department of card issuers. Their way of
designing products, payment structures and portfolio segmentation hasn’t been put
under scrutiny of related research. On the business requirement side, an easy-to-
implement, sensitive and relevant credit risk model will come in handy for banks’ self
assessment and strategic planing.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we give a brief
description on the credit control procedures of credit card issuing banks. Following
that, in section 2.3 a new credit risk model is proposed. In section 2.4 we develop a
Monte Carlo simulation for the model and analyze the distribution of credit losses.
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In addition, the credit losses implied by the model are calculated and compared with
that of the Basel model. Our conclusion for this chapter is given in section 2.5.
2.2 Credit Control Procedures of Credit Card Issuing Banks
Many banks use segmentation approach to manage and analyze credit card portfolios,
which may includes millions of customers. As summarized in Comptroller’s Hand-
book of Credit Lending (Credit Card Lending , 1998), portfolio segmentation usually
considers some aspect of portfolio delinquency, and generally divides the portfolio
into various degrees of delinquency, or buckets, such as: current bucket (M0 bucket);
0-29 days past due (M1 bucket); 30-59 days past due (M2 bucket); 60-89 days past
due (M3 bucket), etc. With the whole portfolio being segmented into various delin-
quency buckets, the probability of moving from one bucket to the next is measured
over time; i.e. the bank’s credit control management department tracks the volume of
loans which roll from, say, the M1 bucket to the M2 bucket, and measure this volume
through a roll-forward rate. Application of the roll-forward rates to the volume of
loans in each bucket will provide some estimation of losses in the existing portfolio.
A credit card issuer will send customer a monthly statement detailing all the
purchases the customer has made with the card during the month. Every statement
explicitly indicates a date by which the customer should pay his credit card bill
without incurring a late payment charge (payment due date). The customer has the
option to pay the bill in full, or make a partial payment subject to a minimum sum.
As a practice, card issuers generally do not charge interest if the outstanding balance
shown on the monthly statement is paid up in full by the payment due date. However
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if the outstanding balance is not paid fully by the due date, interest charges will incur.
A credit card holder can pay a minimum due, which is usually 2% interest charge plus
1% of the principal. If a full or a partial payment is not made by the due date, a late
payment charge would be levied by the card issuer and the customer is considered to
be a M1 delinquent customer. In the next month a M1 delinquent account is required
to at least pay the minimum due as of last month plus 3% of the latest outstanding
balance to bring it back to normal status. Now the customer has three alternative
choices: if the customer is able to pay total due amount, his account is regularized;
if the customer is able to pay only one bucket of payment, the account will stay in
M1 bucket; if he chooses to default again, then the account will flow into M2 bucket.
If the customer continuously default till that his account flow into M7 (180+ DPD),
the card issuer will contractually write the total balance of the account off from its
book and recognize it as a credit loss. Under certain circumstances, card issuer needs
to report credit losses from accounts earlier than 180+ DPD. This type of write-off
is called Non-contractual write-off (NCWO). One of the most common examples of
NCWO is bankruptcy of customer. Hence, there should be a possibility of write-off
for accounts in any bucket. Figure 2.1 illustrate how credit card accounts move in
and out among buckets through different paths.
From the flow chart, we can find that
1. An account needs at least 7 months to flow from the current bucket to contrac-
tual write-off (CWO).
2. Given x ∈ [1, 6], in each month, customers in M(x) bucket will face a x + 3
choices; For example, for an account that currently resides in M1 bucket, there





















Contractual Write-off (180+ DPD)
Figure 2.1: Flow Chart of Credit Card Accounts
Note: DPD denotes days past due; 180+ DPD denotes number of days past due is
greater or equal to 180.
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are four outcomes that can happen in the next month, namely (1) flows back
to M0; (2) stays in M1; (3) roll forward into M2; or (4) is written off (NCWO
in this scenario).
3. Depending on different payment arrangement, different delinquency path can
be chosen by a customer and it will cause different financial impact on the card
issuer’s balance sheet.
4. Unlike accounts in all the buckets, written-off accounts (CWO and NCWO) are
unable to move anywhere.
5. The total credit losses in a given time is the lump sum of losses caused by all
written-off accounts.
The table below gives an example on how the outstanding balance of a non-performing
borrower evolves over time bucket to bucket from a starting balance of $10,000.
Table 2.1: Payment Structure for Bucket Strategy
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Current Due $10,000 $ 9,900 $ 9,801 $ 9,703 $ 9,606 $ 9,510 $ 9,415
1-29 overdue $ 300 $ 303 $ 306 $ 309 $ 313 $ 316
30-59 $ 300 $ 303 $ 306 $ 309 $ 313
60-89 $ 300 $ 303 $ 306 $ 309
90-119 $ 300 $ 303 $ 306
120-149 $ 300 $ 303
150-179 $ 300
Total Balance $10,000 $10,200 $10,404 $10,612 $10,824 $11,041 $11,262
From the above illustration, we implicitly claim that cardholders’ payment behav-
ior is categorized into different ordered response categories reflected as the observed
choices they made. Assuming with a delinquent credit card account, a cardholder
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can choose to pay back to lower buckets, to stay in the same bucket or to roll forward
- actions ranked by payment amount from full payment to no payment. Hence, the
cardholder’s responses can be represented by ordered data 1, 2, 3, · · · . Ordered data
are the most familiar data structures to social scientists. Most common example
will be data obtained from surveys that commonly represent respondents’ opinion on
scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. In the next section, we
introduce the ordinal logit model to demonstrate that this statistical model can be
applied to mimic the bucket strategy in the context of consumer credit risk control.
2.3 A New Credit Risk Model Employing Bucket Strategy
In credit control procedures as described in Section 2, credit card issuing banks track
and collect huge volume of data on borrowers that includes demographic characteris-
tics and performance of credit payment, which are organized in data structures in line
with business procedures. This customer information is used by the banks internally
for the purposes of pricing, scoring and predicting losses etc. Surprisingly, to the
best of our knowledge, so far there exist a very limited literature on how to model
credit card risk to cater the features associated with these business procedures and
banks’ data structures. Given the importance of forecasting credit losses accurately
to banks and regulators, we present here a modeling framework, which leverages on
the knowledge from business procedures and banks’ data structures, to improve the
forecast of credit losses from a credit card portfolio for a given time horizon.
The first step of the proposed model is to segment the portfolio into groups that
can be considered homogeneous from the credit risk perspective. For example, it
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is commonly assumed that all loans in a segment share same probability of default
(PrD). In the literature researchers usually segment portfolios by using risk level,
customer profile and product type, see for example Ieda, Marumo, and Yoshiba (2000).
In this model, we use number of days past due (DPD) to cluster credit card borrowers
resembling the bucket strategy used in the credit card industry. Lack of research on
bucket strategy in the area of credit risk is not coincidental. Most of retail credit
risk model follow basic settings from their corporate counterpart, where default and
non-default (by default these studies usually mean the extent to which banks admit
the debt as credit losses) are the only two states of the borrowers’ behavior. We note
that there is no literature to demonstrate bucket-wise data structure in any statistical
framework. In this chapter, we study cardholder’s path to default (write-off) across
time horizon using segmentation based on buckets as it provides a framework to
calculate future margin income such as interest, late charges, service charges, etc.
prior to write-off at both account and portfolio levels.
However these advantages come with a cost. Each month a cardholder in M(x)
bucket will face a x + 3 choices. Every M1 − M6 buckets accounts can roll back
to any earlier bucket by paying corresponding amount. Banks will write off account
contractually after account is 180+ DPD or un-contractually at any point of time. As
there are many alternative choices available to each cardholder, it is too complicated
to incorporate all of them into credit risk model. We take two approaches to overcome
the problem. Firstly, we use the bucket strategy by grouping all M2 −M6 buckets
into one bucket named M2+. The grouping is supported by the observation that
accounts more than 30 days past due (M2+) are homogeneous in characteristics (as
described in the previous chapter). Secondly, we use ordinal logit model suggested
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by McCullagh (1980).
2.3.1 Statistical Model
The ordinal logit model (also named as proportional odds model) is a class of gen-
eralized linear models used for modeling the dependence of an ordinal response on
discrete or continuous covariates. We adopt this model in this study. For the model
description, we mainly follow the notation used by Johnson and Albert (1999). In
the simplified consumer credit risk scenario, we assume for a credit card account i in





1 if account was paid and delinquency mitigates;
2 if account was paid but delinquency stays (one-bucket payment);
3 if account was not paid and delinquency deteriorated;
4 if account was written off.
(2.1)
Similar to the interpretation of binary response model given in the Section 1.1 of
the Chapter 1, the logit probabilities (log odds) for various choices can be expressed
as a linear function of each cardholder’s underlying characteristics. Suppose that the
unobservable willingness of cardholder to make payments on account i residing in
bucket M2+ is written as
y∗i = β
′xi + ǫi
ǫi ∼ Logistic(θ = 1),
(2.2)
where xi is a vector of risk factors that could affect the cardholders’ decision, and θ
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of Parameters α in Ordinal Classification
is the scale parameter of the logistic distribution. The decision made by cardholder




1 if α0 ≡ −∞ < y∗i ≤ α1,
2 if α1 < y
∗
i ≤ α2,
3 if α2 < y
∗
i ≤ α3,
4 if α3 < y
∗
i < α4 ≡ +∞,
(2.3)
where α is category cutoffs following the ordering constraint α0 ≡ −∞ < α1 <
α2 < α3 < α4 ≡ ∞. For a class of four categories, three cutoffs α1, α2, α3 are
necessary, but we include negative infinity as the lower cutoff for the first category
and positive infinity as the upper cutoff for the forth category for the sake of notational
convenience. An illustration of these cutoffs in the classification of ordinal responses
is plotted in the Figure 2.2. Interpretations on these estimated cutoffs parameters
are provide in Section 2.4 and highlighted by Figure 2.5 in the Section 2.4.
Combining Equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), we obtain that
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= Prob(αc−1 < y
∗
i < αc)
= F (αc − β′xi)− F (αc−1 − β′xi), (2.4)
where c takes a value from {1, 2, 3, 4}, f denotes the density of the standard logis-
tic distribution, and F denotes the cumulative distribution function of the logistic
distribution. Note that the highest value of c is expressed as C, and C = 4 in the
current scenario. Also, in the Equation (2.4), F (αc−β′xi) represents the probability
of account i falls in category c or below, and can be expressed as
Prob(yi ≤ c) = 1
1 + e−(αc−β′xi))
. (2.5)
When c = C, the Equation (2.5) becomes








To visualize the relationship between the independent variables and the ordinal
responses, an illustration of impact of xi on Prob(yi = c) for c = 1, · · · , C is plotted
in the the Figure 2.3. It depicts a scenario of three ordinal outcomes 1, 2 and 3, where
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Figure 2.3: Effect of x on Probabilities of Cardholder’s Choice
Prob(yi = 1) decreases and Prob(yi = 3) increases as x increases. Assuming x as a
continuous independent variable, the x-axis in the Figure 2.3 represents values that
x can take under the assumption that x is continuous independent variable. Given
values of x generated from a probability density function f(x), the probability of the
outcome yi is calculated as F (αyi − β′xi)− F (αyi−1 − β′xi) and plotted against x in
the Figure 2.3.




[F (αyi − β′xi))− F (αyi−1 − β′xi))], (2.9)
where n is the number of accounts in bucket M2+. Albert and Chib (1993) in-
troduce a latent variable method into binary and polychotomous response model to
facilitate model interpretation and estimation. In the way, the Equation (2.9) is
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[f(y∗i − β′xi))I(αyi−1 < y∗i ≤ αyi)]. (2.10)
In Gibbs Sampling algorithm, y∗ will be conveniently sampled from a truncated
normal distribution under ordinal probit setup.
Except Bayesian approach, the ordinal regression model can also be estimated by
the MLE method (IRLS) as introduced in the previous chapter. Both approaches
reported similar results and thus we are indifferent as to which approach should be
taken. However, as we will point out in the next chapter, when the model becomes
more complicated in structure, Bayesian approach is more suitable due to its flexibil-
ity.
2.3.2 Traditional Method for Modeling Credit Losses
In both academic literature and industry applications, the most popular method to
quantitatively analyze credit losses of a consumer credit portfolio is derived from the
seminal work of Moody’s KMV documents by Vasicek (1987) and Vasicek (1991).
However, this method actually follows corporate exposure setup and thus does not
closely connect to consumer portfolios such as credit card portfolios. In this section,
we discuss weakness of the existing model and compare it with the proposed model.
Following a discrete version of Vasicek’s method (Perli & Nayda, 2004), it is
assumed that there are N number of loans (or cardholders in a credit card scenario)
in a credit portfolio. With a given maturity time T , default of loan i happens if the
obligor’s asset value upon maturity, Vi(T ), falls below a certain threshold Ki. Here
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Ki is interpreted as the liability of the obliger. Vi(T ) consists of a single common risk





1− ρ ǫi, (2.11)
where 0 < ρ < 1 represents the common correlation coefficient among all obligers, and
both Y and ǫi follows standard normal distributions but are mutually independent.
In turn, Vi(T ) itself has mean 0 and variance 1.
Let the probability of default PrD, which is conditional on a realization of Y , be
written as















If we denote a random number x as the ratio of default loans out of total N loans,
the cumulative distribution function of x can be expressed as
F (x) = Prob(X ≤ x) =
∫ +∞
−∞




I(p(y) ≤ x)φ(y)dy =
∫ +∞
−y∗
φ(y)dy = Φ(y∗), (2.13)
where I() is the indicator function and y∗ is defined as the boundary such that
p(y) ≤ x for all y > −y∗. Using the relationship between y∗ and x into Equation








Substituting the Equation (2.14) into Equation (2.13), we have the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the ratio of losses:

























This is a highly skewed distribution as characterized by Vasicek (1987).
Credit risk analysts are usually interested in finding out the losses xα for the given












Compare the above result with the Basel II formula for calculating the capital ratio c





− 0.75 · p · LGD, (2.18)
where LGD stands for the Loss Given Default is usually arbitrarily taken or modeled
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separately. We can find the Equation (2.17) is the core part of the Equation (2.18).
Given that Basel formula is regulatory benchmark for the industry, the importance of
the Equation (2.15) is obvious. The new Basel Capital Accord (2003) also suggested a
direct mapping between PrD and ρ for revolving retail portfolio, which can be written
as
ρ = 0.02 · 1− e
−50PrD







The above mentioned method has prominent merits when it is applied to commer-
cial loan portfolio. For example, not only is it backed by solid theoretical foundation
(Merton, 1974) but also it provides a nice analytical solution which helps to use in any
credit portfolio when a few parameters are given. However, there are some shortfalls
when the traditional method is applied to consumer credit risk scenario such as credit
card. Firstly, the theoretical foundation of this method is not suitable in consumer
credit risk area. According to the rules, credit card loans are not compulsorily re-
quired to be paid back before a certain time, cardholder can choose to pay minimum
due and keep his loan revolving; Moreover, the mechanism of default on credit card
loans cannot be measured or explained as a stochastic process of the asset value of a
cardholder with respect to his liability [as discussed in Andrade and Thomas (2004)].
Secondly, the method requires a few assumptions that may not hold in consumer
credit risk realities. For example, it usually assumes that all consumers within a risk
segment have same PrD or assumes that the exposure of each consumer is same within
a segment. Third, from the Equation (2.12), it is clear that the correlation parameter
ρ has significant effect on conditional PrD, p(y). So ignoring specific characteristics
of different segments and different products, using an arbitrary value of ρ will lead to
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misleading forecast to credit losses.
In the next section, we will derive credit losses using Monte Carlo simulation from
the proposed model and compare it with the the credit losses from Vasicek’s method,
which is specified as a core term in Basel II’s capital ratio formula.
2.4 A Monte Carlo Simulation of Credit Losses from the Pro-
posed Model
The proposed model utilizes the ordinal logit model introduced in the subsection 2.3.1
to derive the probability of cardholders’ choices in the next period (next month).
Across multiple periods, credit card accounts can reach any states of from M1 to M6
and write-off, with only exception that once accounts move into write-off state it will
remain forever as write-off because write-off is an irreversible state. Account moves
from one bucket to another bucket depending on cardholder’s payment behavior, and
information on account status is updated by card issuing bank after observing the
cardholder’s response. Payment history of cardholder over a period of time forms a
unique delinquency path out of many possibilities (e.g. M0⇒ M1⇒ M0⇒ M1⇒
M1 · · · ), which eventually results in a distinct economic consequence to the card
issuer. To visualize the above description, Figure 2.4 depicts different delinquent
path of two hypothetical accounts A and B. Accounts A start from M0 and rolls
straightly into write-off by consecutively skipping 7 payments. Account B starts from
M4 and made payments for only one bucket on first, second and forth months before it
flows into write-off. The proposed model is designed not only to calculate percentage
of accounts charged off in a portfolio but also to explicitly define financial quantities
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Starting
month
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Month 7
M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0
M1 M1 M1 M1 M1 M1 M1 M1
M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 M2
M3 M3 M3 M3 M3 M3 M3 M3
M4 M4 M4 M4 M4 M4 M4 M4
M5 M5 M5 M5 M5 M5 M5 M5
M6 M6 M6 M6 M6 M6 M6 M6
Write-off Write-off Write-off Write-off Write-off Write-off Write-off Write-off
Movement of Hyperthetical Account A
Movement of Hyperthetical Account B
Figure 2.4: Different Delinquent Paths of Two Accounts
such as balance and payments along the path chosen. So that a portfolio’s accurate
economic losses rather than credit loss can be assessed.
To calculate credit losses that will incur over 12 month period, we use the proposed
model to derive fitted probability of roll-forward in an iterative way. That is, in each
month accounts are updated on their key performance indicators (hereinafter KPIs)
based on historical performance, and based on updated information the proposed
model will assign fitted probabilities, which are used to decide cardholders’ next
action. Due to intractability of mathematical form of this approach, we have to
employ Monte Carlo simulation to derive the credit losses. That is, in each Monte
Carlo iteration, accounts in a portfolio are pushed into model for simulation and the
portfolio evolves for 12 months according to the simulated results. This iteration is
repeated for a very large number of times, for example 10,000 times. Credit losses at
different confidence level are then extracted from these iterations.
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Here we take a small portfolio from a consumer bank to demonstrate the use of
our proposed model. The accounts are selected with intention to represent a typical
credit card portfolio, rather than to match the actual portfolio of any card issuing
bank. For confidentiality reason, information on portfolio size and observed default
rate are not reported. The data set consists of the monthly tracking of statement
information, i.e. number of days past due and statement balance for a period of one
and half-year. The first six months of data are used to form estimation of model
parameters. Then “alive” accounts at the end of the six-months period are kept as
the target portfolio for simulation purpose. The actual credit losses of the target
portfolio in the last twelve months data are used for reference purpose.
In this chapter as we described earlier in the Chapter 1, we use a KPI, named
the number of times account was delinquent in last 12 months (X12M), as the KPI
in the Equation (2.2) representing the credit quality of the account. We limit to
one KPI in this demonstration to maintain the simplicity of our model. However,
as proposed in Chapter 3, variables representing correlation among credit card loans
within a portfolio, for example unemployment rate and months on book, in introduced
into the model. The parameters are estimated separately for three different buckets -
M0,M1 and M2+ respectively represent accounts residing in the current, 1-29 DPD
and 30+ DPD buckets. The estimation results are reported in the Table 2.2, in which
α represent category cutoffs and X12M denotes the coefficient for the correspond-
ing variable. The estimation is done using MLE approach described in Chapter 1.
Bayesian estimation for the above parameters is similar and hence ignored here.
The estimation results show that the estimates of the cutoffs α are significant in
all three groups and with decreasing values forM0,M1 andM2+ groups respectively.
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Table 2.2: Model Estimation before Simulation
M0 Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Prob>Chi-Sq
α1 3.11 0.04 5845.42 <0.00
α2 9.77 0.55 311.86 <0.00
X12M 0.55 0.01 1498.05 <0.00
M1 Wald
Parameter Estimate S.E. Chi-Square Prob>Chi-Sq
α1 1.87 0.09 421.65 <0.00
α2 3.89 0.13 858.02 <0.00
α3 8.87 0.99 79.16 <0.00
X12M 0.28 0.02 240.46 <0.00
M2+ Wald
Parameter Estimate S.E. Chi-Square Prob>Chi-Sq
α1 0.74 0.26 8.46 <0.00
α2 0.86 0.26 11.22 <0.00
α3 3.71 0.36 108.33 <0.00
X12M 0.16 0.04 18.73 <0.00
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This suggests that the credit worthiness of credit card accounts decreases as accounts
move into higher buckets. Consider for example the probability of write-off. The
probability of an M0 account being written off is equal to the probability of y∗i >
α2 = 9.77. For M1 accounts, the probability of being written off is equal to the
probability of y∗i > α3 = 8.87. And for M2+ accounts α3 = 3.71. Thus, holding β
′x
constant, the probability of an M2+ account being written off is higher than those
of M0 and M1 accounts. This is depicted in the Figure 2.5.
We also find that the slop of risk factor X12M decreases as accounts move into
higher buckets. Regression coefficients for X12M read as 0.55, 0.28 and 0.16 for
M0, M1 and M2+ accounts respectively. This is also intuitive, for M2+ accounts
X12M values are all very high (all close to the ceiling 12), which makes this KPI less
discriminating as compared to M0 and M1 accounts. This characteristic of the data
is shown by the binary response model in the Chapter 1 as well.
The estimated parameters are then used for generating fitted probabilities in dif-
ferent portfolios using the Equation (2.5). To simulate decisions made by cardholders,
a random number is drawn from uniform density on the (0, 1) interval for each ac-
count. If the random number drawn from uniform distribution is equal to or less than
the fitted probability Prob(y¯i = 1) then the simulated decision is given as yˆi = 1. Else
if the random number falls in the range (Prob(y¯i = 1), P rob(y¯i = 1) + Prob(y¯i = 2)],
then yˆi = 2, so on so forth. Here, Prob(y¯i = c) denotes the fitted probability with up-
dated account i’s information and yˆi denotes the cardholder’s choice simulated using
the introduced method. We use 10,000 iterations in this study to generate the simu-
lated distribution of credit losses. For comparison purpose, the distributions of losses

























Prob(y*=4) or probability of write−off
Prob(y*=4) or probability of write−off
Figure 2.5: Comparison of Estimated Cutoffs among M0, M1 and M2+
respectively based on normal and stressed scenarios are derived from their analytical
form of Vasicek’s method.
Figure 2.6 represents the density plots of the simulated losses from the proposed
model in comparison to the density distributions derived from the Vasicek (1991)
method. Two densities are drawn using Vasicek method. Vasicek Density (normal)
is drawn using actual PrD and the corresponding ρ calculating from Equation (2.19).
Vasicek Density (stressed) utilizes a PrD with 0.5% added on the actual PrD. Descrip-
tive statistics of these three distributions are presented in Table 2.3 for comparison.
The simulated distribution from the proposed model is represented by a red dot
line in the Figure 2.6. It shows that the simulated distribution seems symmetric.
But based on the descriptive statistics in the Table 2.3, it is actually skewed towards
high loss because that the distribution mean (268,360) falls at the right-hand side of
CHAPTER 2. BUCKET STRATEGY AND CREDIT CARD CREDIT RISK 52

















Figure 2.6: Simulated Loss Density from Proposed Model vs Vasicek Density
Table 2.3: Comparison of Simulated Density and Vasicek Density
Model Simulated Vasicek Density Vasicek Density
Loss Density (stressed)
Mean 268,360 72,104 97,864
Median 266,470 59,471 84,571
Mode 259,340 40,333 63,842
99% Percentile 372,248 249,072 297,003
99.9% Percentile 403,383 366,965 418,513
99.97% Percentile 423,563 423,686 475,503
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median (266,470) and mode (259,340). Credit loss distributions are usually designed
as skewed towards right-hand side to simulate potential extreme credit losses. The
conventional Vasicek distribution is represented by a grey dot-dash line in the Figure
2.6. This is a highly skewed distribution with mean, median and mode equal to 72,104,
59,471 and 40,333 respectively, which is too naive as compared with the actual credit
losses, 370,994 observed at the end of the 12-month forecast period. Similar findings
is observed for the stressed Vasicek credit losses distribution as shown in the blue
line. However, Vasicek distributions have very thick right tails to compensate the
lack of accuracy on mean and median. In this way, Vasicek distributions can have
similar tail behaviors as our proposed model (see 99%-99.97% percentiles reported in
the Table 2.3).
To summarize, we highlight a few differences from the comparison of the two
methods:
1. Vasicek’s densities are highly skewed towards right in comparison to a almost
symmetric density from the proposed model.
2. The proposed model provided much more realistic forecast on losses than Va-
sicek models (see the comparison of expected losses from the Vasicek model,
the proposed model and the actual loss given in the Figure 2.6), suggesting
the Vasicek model might have significantly underestimate portfolio losses at its
distribution mean. The finding is not surprising as per the shortfall we gave
earlier - the Vasicek method and the related Basel II formula for retail portfolio
are conceptually derived from corporate credit risk context and are designed
more for regulatory purpose than for purposes of business decision making such
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as profitability forecast.
3. When comparing tail part of the losses distributions, Table 2.3 displays that
simulated distribution is similar to both Vasicek distributions. Moreover, in
this paper we consider i.i.d. assumption for all the credit card performance
records. Although credit card portfolio is usually highly granular, we can im-
prove further our model to assume various kinds of associations among credit
card performance records. Hence, we expect the credit loss distribution from
the proposed model will be more skewed towards right. (To see how correlation
could result on the shape of distribution, let’s use Vasicek distribution as exam-
ple. In Equation (2.17), xα = Φ(Φ
−1(p)) = p if ρ = 0, hence, f(x) is symmetric
and follows standard normal distribution). We discuss and propose a model to
cater for various associations within credit card portfolios in Chapter 3.
2.5 Conclusion
Today, credit card issuers usually derive probability of default and other statistics
(e.g. ρ) from their own internal rating based models and substitute these parameters
into Basel formula to generate perspective on credit losses and capital ratio. This
paper provides conceptually different framework for credit risk inference instead of
the traditional method.
We introduce the bucket strategy, utilized by credit control procedure of credit card
issuers, into modeling credit losses from a credit card portfolio. Hence, the proposed
method resembles industry practitioner’s perspectives on causes and occurring of
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credit losses and therefore can generate more economically meaningful expectation
on credit losses. On the other hand, traditional methods and widely accepted Basel
II formula derive credit losses relying on theory of corporate credit risk and some
simplification assumptions, which should be put under scrutiny in consumer credit
risk context.
The analytic form of the proposed model is unknown due to the complex scenario
assumed. Hence, Monte Carlo simulation is used to study the distribution of credit
losses from the proposed model. From a small but representative portfolio of credit
card accounts, we find that our model is more accurate in capturing the expected
losses than the traditional model so that card issuers are able to provide more accurate
loss provisions. As a consequence, the capital required thus can be smaller due to
the more accurate expectation on losses. Based on more economically meaningful
forecast on credit losses, card issuers are able to select risk appetite properly and
make reasonable judgement on product profitability . As a result, they can carry out
more precise pricing and strategic planning on their products.
In terms of extreme losses forecast, the simulated distribution based on our model
suggests that the new model is more concentrated toward center and thus has slightly
thinner tail than the distribution generated from the Vasicek model. But the distri-
bution from the proposed model, benefitted from more accurate location parameters,
provides similar tail behavior to those based on Vasicek models. Moreover, we can
further improve the proposed model by incorporating proper correlation structures
of payment behavior of credit card accounts within a portfolio such that the simu-
lated distribution will be more significantly skewed towards high loss side. We aim
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to provide an advanced model to explain various associations of credit card accounts
in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
Credit Risk Model for Hierarchical
Structure
3.1 Introduction
Familiarized with various retail credit risk concepts and those statistical approaches
of modeling discrete responses introduced in the previous chapters, in this chapter, I
established a new credit risk model with hierarchical structure, which borrows statis-
tical methods from other research areas such as educational and biomedical studies
and provides a new direction to credit risk research for further growth. In most ex-
isting statistical methods, basic unit of analysis is usually individual loan account.
Thus, association among accounts owned by single customer is ignored. In addition,
these methods do not monitor cardholders’ credit worthiness across multiple time
periods. Therefore, valuable information such as inter-account correlation, autocor-
related behavior or macro-economic impact on a cohort is ignored. In contrast, the
proposed model is intended to analyze underlying credit worthiness of credit card
holders measured by ordinal responses to single or multiple items, where items rep-
resent one or multiple financial decision problems faced by a credit card holder on a
57
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particular time-point (in a month or a quarter). Items are nested within a time-point
and time-points in turn are nested within a subject (credit card holder). Therefore, a
very flexible structure of association among observations can be assumed. On top of
this merit, the special design of the model can allow us handle missing observations
at time- and item-level, which is a common problem in longitudinal analysis. The
model was implemented on a dataset sampled from credit card cardholders’ popula-
tion of a consumer bank employing Bayesian approach via Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we give a
brief description on the credit card accounts structures and the hierarchical model,
which is popular in other research areas. Based on it, in section 3.3 we describe
the data used in this study. In section 3.4 we develop a new credit risk model that
can leverage on the credit card accounts structure to analyze the various correlations
within the credit card portfolio. We discuss the proposed model in section 3.5 and
compare it with four reference models. The Section 3.6 concludes the Chapter 3.
3.2 Introduction to Credit Card Account Structure and Hi-
erarchical Models
3.2.1 Credit Card Account Structure
Credit cards are not only a tool used by consumers to make retail transaction con-
venient but also a cost saving channel widely utilized in consumers’ daily life: credit
card issuers will typically offer special offers, like discount, rewards points cumulation
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or cash rebate, target to different types of credit cards segments. Thus there is an
incentive for consumers to hold multiple credit card accounts for different spending
purpose. In some countries, e.g. in Singapore, credit card market supervision enforce
a combined credit limit policy which requires multiple credit card account under one
customer’s name have to share one credit limit. Under this scenario, it is important for
card issuers to identify and analyze credit risk at customer level rather than account
level, because risk indicators emerged from a single account cannot fully describe the
true risk level intrinsic to a cardholder who own multiple credit card accounts.
However, surprisingly many credit card issuers and their risk mitigation opera-
tions still mainly rely on account level risk analysis. This is not due to limitation
of information acquisition – equipped with modern credit card account management
systems, credit cards issuers can produce and access huge volume of customer infor-
mation on daily basis. The roadblock of fully utilizing customer information is that
there is little choice of statistical models that can describe association of individual
accounts under same customer. For instance, if a customer has two credit cards ac-
counts, one is 30 days past due and the other is a prompt payment account, how
the correlation act on customer’s behavior on each of the two remains an unsolved
puzzle to credit card issuers. Therefore, in literature, research papers on credit card
delinquency analysis, for example Gross and Souleles (2002) and Zhao, Zhao, and
Song (2006), generally use credit card accounts as main units of analysis rather than
individuals or households.
As one of the important credit processes, information on applicants, for example
demographic data, are collected at the time of card application, which is usually
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Customer i, for i = 1 to N 
Time j, for j = 1 to J 
......
......
Account k, for k = 1 to Ki 
Account 1 Account Ki...... Account 1 Account Ki’......
Figure 3.1: Credit Card Accounts Structure
seen as static information. After accepting a particular applicant as customer by a
card issuer, cardholder’s accounts are reviewed and evaluated at different points in
time. The recorded information is usually called snapshots of the cardholder and is
dynamic. As mentioned above, customers would like to apply for multiple credit card
accounts to meet their different types of demands. One customer may have multiple
credit card accounts, which are usually tracked and recorded separately. Thus we can
imagine credit cards portfolio of a credit card issuer as data organized in hierarchy.
By hierarchy we mean structures that consist of units grouped at different levels. The
fact that snapshot of account information are nested under a snapshot of a customer,
which in turn are grouped under each individual customer, can be depicted by Figure
3.1.
3.2.2 Application of Hierarchical Models
This hierarchical data structures, though not familiar to retail credit risk researchers,
increase in popularity in social and behavioral science and clinical trials studies. For
example, offspring from the same parents tend to be more alike in their physical
and mental characteristics than individuals chosen at random from the population at
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large. Many designed experiments also create data hierarchies, for example clinical
trials carried out in several randomly chosen centers or groups of individuals.
Singer (1998) introduced a flexible method for fitting multilevel models, hierarchi-
cal models, and individual growth model. In her paper, she took classical two-level
school effects model as an example. In the two-level school effects example, she
described a general situations in which data are nested at two levels. It is an orga-
nizational hierarchy such as students grouped within classes and then classes nested
within schools. The goal of her study is to examine the behavior of a level-1 out-
come (student performance) as a function of both level-1 (class effects) and level-2
(school effects) predictors. However, the idea presented by the example can be easily
extended to three-level or multilevel models.
In the area of survey or experiment analysis, measurements are usually repeated
on the same subjects for different time-points. Such data are often referred to as
’longitudinal’ (or panel in economics context) as opposed to ’cross-sectional’ where
each subject is measured only once. Longitudinal data can be involved in hierarchical
models. Consider for example a data set consisting of repeated measurements of the
heights of a random sample of children. Then the linear model between height of
individual i at time j, yij , and age (xij) can be expressed as
yij = β0 + β1xij + eij (3.1)
Moreover, equation (3.1) can be easily extended to include further explanatory vari-
ables, measured either at the time level, such as household average income of year, or
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at the subject level such as birthweight. For example the equations for the discussed
model can be formed as below [see Goldstein (2002) for more details]
yij = β0 + β1xij + β2si + β2wj + eij where eij ∼ N(0, σ2)
si = α0 + α1BirthWeighti + ri where ri ∼ N(0, τ 2)
wj = δ0 + δ1AvgIncomej + uj where uj ∼ N(0, υ2),
where response-level explanatory variables si and wj themselves rely on subject-level
variable BirthWieght and time-level variable AvgIncome.
A hierarchical model can also be extended to include autoregressive structure.
Wang, Yau, Lee, and McLachlan (2007) presented a multilevel survival frailty model
for analyzing clustered data and recurrent disease among aged population. Beside the
cross-sectional correlations of observations due to similar residential environments
considered in their model, the subject level serial dependence is assumed between
recurrent events recorded on the same individual. Therefore, their method incorpo-
rated random components into the usual survival frailty model to account for the
autoregressive structure.
Given the similar data structure between credit card accounts (as depicted in Sec-
tion 3.1.1) and above-mentioned social science and clinical trials studies, I developed
a credit risk model as a special three-level hierarchical generalized linear model that
can be applied to ordinal data with complex data structures. The aim is to compre-
hensively model credit card accounts data with the following features: (a) velocity of
deterioration along increasing delinquency bucket, (b) correlations of accounts at dif-
ferent buckets but under same cardholder, (c) impact of macro-economic environment
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on cardholders decision, (d) dynamic structure of cardholder’s credit worthiness.
3.3 The Data
Credit card account records, collected and organized by credit card issuers, usually
consist of a wide range of details on each account. Following Avery, Calem, and Can-
ner (2004), the data can be classified into five broad categories: Account identification
(eg account number and customer number), account dates (eg account open date and
write-off date), account balances, account description, and payment performance.
The credit account records used in this study is provided by a consumer bank in
Singapore. The sample includes information on monthly statements of 189 credit card
accounts (143 cardholders) from December 2002 to June 2004. All the credit card
accounts in our sample are active at the the beginning of our sample period (excluding
written-off accounts and closed inactive accounts). These accounts are, at least once,
30 days past due in customer level repayment history 1 and are randomly selected
from the bank’s credit card customer database. 2 The performance of these accounts
are tracked through the first quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2004. Duration
of the sample is selected for several reasons: (1) due to business confidentiality and
agreement with the bank, very limited time horizon is allowed to be used in this study.
For a randomly-selected sample, only 19-month continuous tracking on restricted
variables is available; (2) To demonstrate applicability of the proposed model under
various timing environments, the sample period managed to include seasonality effects
1This study focuses on delinquent cardholders’ behavior and thus only cardholders with stain on
their repayment history are selected.
2Banks usually assign a random number to an account upon the time of booking. Utilizing the
random digit, x% of the bank’s customer base was randomly picked up for the study.
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i.e. Jan-Feb holiday season, extreme economic downturn of Singapore economy in
the third and fourth quarter of 2003; (3) SARS period was included as SARS crisis
broke out in Singapore in March 2003, which essentially hurt Singapore economic
performance in the third and fourth quarter of 2003, and the impact quickly faded
out after that. How Singapore credit card holders responded to this short term crisis
is an interesting question that can be answered by the proposed model. The data
provides card holder identifications3, delinquency history, credit limit, open dates and
account status. In addition, the data set also provides information on consumers’
demographics such as age, gender and nationality.
We present summary statistics of cardholders’ performance and demographic vari-
ables in Table 3.1. There are 142 cardholders 188 active accounts prior to beginning
of the first quarter of 2003 in the sample. The sample size reduced to 99 cardholders
with 129 active accounts at 2004 Q2 beginning, which is due to 59 accounts were
written off during 2003 Q1 - 2004 Q1. Specifically, we define an account with pay-
ment that can clear at least one bucket due as staying or improving in a sense that its
delinquency bucket will remain unchange or reduce. The metric No. Acct stay / Im-
prv in the Table 3.1 represents quantity of this type of accounts as of each sub-sample
period. Account deterioration is defined as the situation where next quarter worst
bucket is worse than current quarter worst bucket. Volume of this type of accounts
across sub-sample periods is given as metric No. Acct Deteriorate in the Table 3.1.
The corresponding percentage ratio of these two metrics are presented in the the 6th
row and 7th row respectively. It can be observed that there is a significant increase
3Cardholders’ identification information used in this study was converted from original customer
numbers into descending serial numbers, and thus can only be used for tagging. In this way no
customer sensitive information was released by the bank.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Performance and Demographic Variables
2003 Q1 2003 Q2 2003 Q3 2003 Q4 2004 Q1
No. Cardholders 142 137 124 112 99
No. Acct Stay / Imprv 102 110 78 80 84
No. Acct Deteriorated 81 57 70 49 35
No. Acct Written-off 5 16 19 19 10
% Acct Deteriorate 43.1% 31.1% 41.9% 33.1% 27.1%
% Acct Written-off 2.7% 8.7% 11.4% 12.8% 7.8%
Avg Balance $ 4,277 $ 4,230 $ 4,287 $ 4,525 $ 3,993
Avg Dlq Mth Lst 12 mth 7.2 8.2 9.0 8.8 8.3
Avg MOB 60.6 63.3 67.3 71.1 72.4
Avg Age 40 40 39 39 40
No. Foreign Accts 5 5 3 3 2
Unemply Rate 3.7% 3.6% 4.8% 3.9% 3.7%
Note: Please refer to the text for a description of full terms.
of deterioration rate and written-off rate in 2003 Q3. Singapore unemployment rates
4 are given in the last row of Table 3.1, which supports a positive correlation of un-
employment rate and credit card deteriorate/default rate. Avg Balance, Avg Dlq Mth
Lst 12 mth and Avg MOB give the average balance size (in SG$), average number
of delinquent months per cardholder in last 12 month and average months on book
respectively. Cardholders’ average age and percentage of foreigner accounts in the
portfolio are reported in the table as well.
Figure 3.2 shows numbers of ”survived” accounts and ”survived” cardholders at
each month and how the sample size shrinks over time. The dropout accounts/cardholders
are those accounts written off from bank’s financial book and are removed from our
4Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate. Obtained from Minster of ManPower website:
http://www.mom.gov.sg/publish/momportal/en/communities/others/mrsd/statistics/Unemployment.html















































Figure 3.2: Dropout of Accounts & Customers over sample period
sample. Similar to other longitudinal studies, data used in this research requires ca-
pability of handling missing records. In this study it is assumed that the missing
mechanism is ignorable and thus inference is based on the observed-data posterior of
all parameters only, ignoring the missing data mechanism. The ignorability condition,
first described by Rubin (1976), can be used to facilitate posterior inference without
having to specify the missing data mechanism. In later sections, detailed conditions
of ignorable missing data mechanism are introduced. In literature, data sets in which
time points may vary among individuals are quoted as imbalanced data. I use the
following notations for missing data at the time-level. Ni is the total number of ob-
servations for cardholder i in the sample, and subscript “ij” is used to denote the j-th
observation for the cardholder i. We note that the only cause of missing records in this
study is the write-off process of the issuing bank, which is non-reversible - meaning
that accounts will surely be excluded from the sample after written-off. Therefore,
the j-th observation of any cardholder unanimously refers to the jth time period of
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the sample for all cardholders. However, the total number of observations of card-
holder i, Ni, can vary across different is, which depends on how soon accounts under
the cardholder i will be written off.
Data grouping and categorizing are used to simplify the question studied but
without limiting the generality of the model. Due to similar reasons stated in the
Chapter 2, M2+ (30+ days past due) accounts are grouped together as one item
in cardholder’s process of decision making. The grouping takes assumption that
accounts with DPD over 30 days are homogeneous in characteristics. In this model
we define a cardholder CMi maximally have three items at a time point j
CMij with
〈 Item 1 : if account(s) in M0,
Item 2 : if account(s) in M1,
Item 3 : if account(s) in M2 + .
To account for missing observations at the item level, Kij denotes a set of items that
are observed for cardholder i at the j-th time point. For example, if the first and the
third items are observed at the j-th time point for cardholder i, then Kij = {1, 3}.
Cardholders are measured in two dimensions: time and item. Let yijk denote a
response to the k-th item at the j-th time point for cardholder i. The category of
response to item k is denoted as c, where c can take value from 1 to C. Although
number of categories can be different over items, for simplicity we make it consis-
tent across all items that each item can have three categories, improved/stay flat,
worsening and written-off, which are specified as follows.




1 if account(s) performance improve/stayflat,
2 if account(s) performance worsen,
3 if account(s) written− off.
3.4 The Model
In this section, we describe the suitable model for the above-mentioned data structure.
Taking into consideration of the two-dimensional measure of credit records of card-
holders, which is time and item, we present here a three-level model,which accounts for
credit information grouped at item level (within-time), time level (within-cardholder)
and between-cardholder level. A similar three-level structure can be found in Segawa
(2005), where a multi-indictor growth model were formulated to analyze growth of
trait latent variable measured by ordinal items.
3.4.1 Item Level (Within-time Level) Model
The item level ordinal response is modeled by standard ordinal logit model. Similar
to the preceding chapter, I denote the “true” value of the ith cardholder’s latent
capability of repayment debt for item k on time point j as y∗ijk. y
∗
ijk is a continuous
latent variable which determine the observed response yijk,




1 if −∞ < y∗ijk ≤ αk1,
2 if αk1 < y
∗
ijk ≤ αk2,




where αkc is the threshold parameter indicating the upper cutoff of category c of item
k. αkc needs to satisfy the condition αk0 < αk1 < αk2 < αkC , where αk0 and αkC are
−∞ and ∞ respectively.
In responding to item k at time point j, cardholder is assumed to make a decision
based on the latent variable
y∗ijk = β0k + β1kθij + ǫijk + ǫ
∗
ijk (3.3)
where ǫ∗ijk is independently and identically distributed as the standard logistic for




e∗ . For model identifiability, the
standard approach for logit / ordinal logit regression models is to fix location and
scale parameters of logistic distribution as 0 and 1 respectively. We follow the same
setup in our model. Hence, σ2e∗ =
π2
3
for ǫ∗ijk in the Equation 3.3. If ǫ
∗
ijk is the only
error term in the model, then, as discussed in the Chapter 1, the model’s dispersion
parameter equals to 1, which is usually not true in real social/economic applications.
To enable flexible parametrization of the model’s over-dispersion or under-dispersion,
another error term is included in the model. The second error term ǫijk, representing
random effect and supposed to capture variability of outcomes of items over that
specified by the ”fixed effects”, is normally distributed with var(ǫijk) = σ
2
e . For
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identifiability, the mean random effect is assumed to be 0 and the variance of the
random effect σ2e is estimated from the data. θij is a latent trait, which represents
underlying credit worthiness of cardholder i at time j. β0k and β1k represent intercept
and slope parameters at item level, respectively.
Following the conventional ordinal logit setup, use Qijk,c to denote the cumulative
probability that cardholder i responds to the k-th item at j-th time point by choosing
category c or below. Therefore, Qijk,c = pijk,c + pijk,c−1 + · · · + pijk,1, where pijk,c =









= αkc − (β0k + β1kθij). (3.4)
Then the probability of cardholder i responding to item k at j-th observation with
category c is given by pijk,c = Qijk,c −Qijk,c−1. The likelihood function for item level










where yijk is the observed value of category c for subscript ijk.
If we parameterize the model by using the latent data y∗ along with the parameters








f(y∗ijk − (β0k + β1kθij + ǫijk))I(αyijk−1 ≤ y∗ijk < αyijk), (3.6)
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where I(·) indicates the indicator function. Note that the latent variables y∗ijk may
be integrated out of equation (3.6) to obtain equation (3.5). This representation of
likelihood suggests a simple Gibbs sampling approach for simulating from the joint
posterior of (y∗, β, α), which will be elaborated with multilevel setup in later section.
3.4.2 Time Level (Within-cardholder Level) Model
The within-cardholder level model is used to specify the variation of the latent trait
of a cardholder over time periods on top of item level specification. The within-
cardholder model is of the form
θij = z
′
ijui + ǫθij , (3.7)
where z′ij = [Zij,0Zij,1 · · ·Zij,P ] represents P explanatory variables at time level (within-
cardholder level), and u′i = [ui0ui1 · · ·uiP ] is the corresponding regression coefficient
vector.
Depending on the characteristics of the data, the residuals of cardholder traits
ǫθij are able to be specified as either i.i.d. or autoregressive process. For i.i.d., the
residuals of traits are given as
ǫθij ∼ N(0, σ2θ). (3.8)
For autoregressive process setup, to maintain the simplicity of the study, we only
consider AR(1) for ǫθij . In this case, the following conditions of the data need to be
satisfied: (1) There should be no interruption between observations for each card-
holder. For example, the observed time points should not be 1, 2, 4. (2) The time
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interval of observations should be equally spaced. These conditions are naturally
satisfied as the missing data mechanism in this study is driven by card issuers’ write-
off process which is not reversible; cardholders’ performances are all measured on
quarterly basis. The AR(1) trait residual ǫθij is modeled as
ǫθij = φǫθi,j−1 + ǫ
∗
θi,j
, |φ| < 1 (3.9)
where φ is the autoregressive coefficient. For all i = 1 . . .N and j = 2 . . . J , ǫ∗θi,j are
independent and identically distributed as N(0, σ2θ). Assuming stationarity, for all
cardholders at j > 1, the residual should be specified as
ǫθij ∼ N(0,
σ2θ
1− φ2 ). (3.10)
For time level explanatory variables, the key performance indicator, customer
level number of months account delinquent in last 12 months (CMX12), is picked up
to measure cardholder performance in recent period. The raw data of this variable
(with mean ranged from 7.2 to 9.0 as shown in Table 3.1) is demeaned and then scaled
down by 10. Unemployment rate is selected to reflect the macro-economic effects. In
the conference on validation of consumer credit risk model held by Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia and Wharton School in 2004, one of the key topics discussed
by consumer credit risk researchers is that credit issuing banks should incorporate
market and economic variables in their internal scoring and loss forecasting models to
cater for factors influencing loan repayment that are outside of an individual’s control
(Burns & Ody, 2004). A preliminary observation from the Table 3.1 support a positive
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correlation between unemployment rate and credit card repayment deterioration rate
and write-off rate. In this study, unemployment rates (UE) enters into the model as a
proxy for social and economic factors and is identical for all cardholders at the same
time point.
3.4.3 Between-cardholder level Model
The underlying variation of the regression coefficients, ui, over cardholders is further
modeled by a linear regression sub-model involving cardholder-level covariates, si
ui = s
′
iv + ǫui (3.11)
and
ǫui ∼ N(0,Σu), (3.12)
where v is a vector that represents equation coefficients of the between-cardholder
level model, and ǫui is i.i.d. for all i. We use Σu to denote covariance matrix of
ǫui. For simplicity, let’s assume that ǫ
∗
ijk, ǫθ∗ij , and ǫui are mutually independent.
For cardholder level variable, Months on Book (MOB) is picked up. The quantity is
measured as number of months since the date credit cardholder was approved for a
credit card by the issuing bank to the beginning of the sample period. This variable
is commonly used by the industry and credit risk researchers as an effective predictor
for consumer credit risk. Comparing those with shorter period of relationship with
a bank, cardholder with years of relationship with the bank is more likely to survive
repayment difficulty and continue the borrowing relationship with the bank. These
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characteristics are consistent with our sample as shown by the Table 3.1. For example,
the portfolio average MOB stands at 60.6 months at 2003 Q1, which increases over
time and ends at 72.4 months at 2004 Q1, suggesting more ’young’ accounts are
purged from sample due to bank’s write-off process.
3.5 Model Estimation and Results
3.5.1 Markov chain Monte Carlo Estimation Approach for
Multilevel Ordinal Response Model
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are increasingly being used for the esti-
mation of multilevel model due to its ability to be flexibly extended to complex model
structures where maximum likelihood method may not be able to be implemented
easily. Other than that, MCMC methods can help us to generate the exact posterior
distribution of any function of the unknown parameters and are able to incorporate
prior beliefs into model estimation. Thus similar to the approach used in the Chapter
1, the multilevel ordinal model is estimated using MCMC methods. Albert and Chib
(1993) proposed an MCMC algorithm for estimation of a single-level probit model
for binary and polychotomous data, which is closely related to our study. This algo-
rithm was later extended by Goldstein and Browne (2005) to estimate mixed binary
responses. Goldstein, Bonnet, and Rocher (2007) gives a detailed description on the
estimation of the factor model for mixed binary and ordinal responses.
In this study, the data consist of: 1) the item level responses yijk; 2) the values
of the time level and cardholder level explanatory variables, denoted by Z and S
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respectively; 3) parameters β, u and v represent regression coefficients for item, time
and between-cardholder level respectively; 4) variance components σ2e , σ
2
θ and Σu; 5)
autoregressive coefficient φ at time level; 6) cardholder credit worthiness parameter
θ and item level latent trait y∗. As a result, the full posterior distribution of the
parameters, given the information from the data, is derived from equation (3.6) as












f(y∗ijk|θij,βk,αk, σ2e , yijk)








where f(β) is defined as a normal prior distribution for item level regression co-
efficients; f(α) denotes prior beliefs of category cutoffs; f(φ) represents a uniform
prior ranging from -1 to 1; item level and time level variance coefficient f(σ2e) and
f(σ2θ) both follow inverse gamma as literature convention; and an inverse Wishart
(Wishart is essentially a multivariate gamma) prior is assumed for f(Σu). I selected
non-informative priors in this study such that the prior will have minimal impact
relative to the data.
As shown above, the simultaneous posterior distribution of all model parameters
is quite complicated and has no close form. Therefore, the complete set of parameters
is segmented into a number of subsets in such a way that the conditional posterior
distribution of every subset given all other parameters has a tractable form and can
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be easily sampled. A MCMC procedure will be used for drawing samples from the
conditional posterior distributions. For simplicity of illustration, let’s assume the link
function is a standard normal distribution (ordinal probit model). Then conditional
on current values of θij ,βk,αk, σ
2
e , yijk the posterior distribution of y
∗
ijk result in
f(y∗ijk|θij ,βk,αk, σ2e , yijk) ∝ N(y∗ijk; β0k + β1kθij , σ2e)I(αyijk−1 ≤ y∗ < αyijk), (3.14)
where N(·; a, b) denotes a normal density with mean a and variance b and I(·) is the
indicator function. Equation (3.14) suggests a truncated normal distribution we can
sample y∗ijk from. Conditional posterior for the rest of parameters can be derived
in a similar way. The detailed discussion on sampling procedures can be found in
Goldstein et al. (2007).
With a very flexible setup of multilevel models it should be noted that in order
for multilevel models to be identifiable some constraints must be imposed on the
parameters. These will consist of fixing the values of some parameters. For this
purpose, β0k = 0 and β1k = 1 is held as constant for k = 1, and αk = 0 are imposed
for k = 1, . . . , K.
In our dataset, not all accounts survive till the end of the sample period. It is
assumed that the missing mechanism is ignorable. To define missing data assumption,
it is useful to express missing data mechanism as
p(r|y,x,ψ) = p(r|yobs,ymiss,x,ψ), (3.15)
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where r denote missing data indicators. y,x,ψ are respectively responses, indepen-
dent variables and model coefficients. Missing data mechanism is called as “missing
at random” (MAR) if, for all yobs, x and ψ,
p(r|yobs,ymiss,x,ψ) = p(r|yobs,x,ψ); (3.16)
i.e., if p(r|yobs,ymiss,x,ψ) is a constant function of ymiss (Daniels & Hogan, 2008).
This is closely related to our data as the only dropout reason in this study is the
write-off process of credit card issuing bank, denoted as yiwk = 3, where w is the
write-off time. That is, missing indicator, ri,w+m,k, at time w +m equals to 1 for all
m > 0 irrespective of yi,w+m,k.
With MAR assumption, missing mechanism is ignorable and thus inference is
based on the observed-data posterior of all parameters, ψ. There are two methods
to sample from observed-data posterior, augmented Gibbs (Tanner & Wong, 1987)
and nonaugmented Gibbs (Segawa, 2005). We have chosen the nonaugmented Gibbs
method over the augmented Gibbs method in this study due to the computational
advantages associated with augmented Gibbs.
3.5.2 Convergency Check, Model Justification and Results
MCMC is introduced as above to create a Markov Chain whose stationary distribution
is the same as the posterior distribution of target parameters. If many samples are
extracted from the chain, they should converge to the posterior distribution. In
this study I simultaneously run three chains with dispersed initial values. The total
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number of samples is 180,000 (= [50000 + 10000] × 3) for each analysis. Here the
length of burn-in is taken as 50,000 for each chain. However, that can be shortened
because we usually find convergence after around 10,000 iterations.
Convergency Check
In the literature, there are several methods to decide whether convergence has been
reached. Gelman-Rubin convergence statistic (BGR thereafter), as modified by Brooks
and Gelman (1998), is used in this study. BGR statistics are plotted in Figure 3.3.
This BGR method calculates the width of the central 80% interval of the pooled
runs, shown in green line, and average width of the 80% intervals within the individ-
ual runs, shown as blue line. Their ratio R (=pooled/within) is represented as red
line. For plotting purpose the pooled and within interval width are normalized to
have an overall maximum of one. The statistics are calculated in bins of length 50:
R would generally be expected to be greater than 1 if the starting values are suitably
dispersed. Brooks and Gelman emphasize that one should be concerned both with
convergence of R to 1, and with convergence of both the pooled and within interval
widths to stability. For all 25 parameters estimated in the model, BGR plots show R
converges to 1, and green and blue lines stabilize after 20,000 iterations. BGR plots
for only four parameters are reported in Figure 3.3 for the sake of conciseness.
Model Selection
To illustrate the advantages of the model employed in this study, I present four refer-
ence models with increasing complexity, starting from a basic linear regression model.
Model comparisons and selections are based on the Deviance Information Criteria
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Figure 3.3: BGR statistic for convergence checking
(DIC) [see (Spiegalhalter, Best, Carline, & Linde, 2002) for details]. DIC is intended
as a generalization of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for hierarchical models.
Let’s assume y and ψ represent the whole collection of data and model parameters,
respectively. Spiegalhalter et al. (2002) defined effective number of parameters in a
model, pD, as
pD = Eψ|y[D(ψ)]−D(Eψ|y[ψ]) = D −D(ψ), (3.17)
where D(ψ) is the deviance function, D(ψ) = −2log f(y|ψ) + 2log h(y). Here,
f(y|ψ) is the likelihood function of the data and h(y) is the likelihood function
evaluated at the observed proportions. To see how pD represents number of effective
parameters, expand D(ψ) around estimates ψ
D(ψ) ≈ D(ψ)− (ψ −ψ)TL′′ψ(ψ −ψ)
≈ D(ψ) + χ2p, (3.18)
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where the second step is based on Bayesian Central Limit Theorem. Taking ex-
pectations with respect to the posterior distribution of ψ for equation (3.18) and
substituting into equation (3.17) result in
pD = Eψ|y[D(ψ)]−D(ψ) ≈ p. (3.19)
The above shows the pD will be approximately the true number of parameters.
Posterior expectation of deviance function, D = Eψ|y[D(ψ)], can be taken as an
indicator of the fit of the model. Similar to AIC, DIC statistic summarizes goodness
of fit and parsimoniousness of models within Bayesian context by setting
DIC = D + pD. (3.20)
The models with small DIC are preferred (smaller the better). Table 3.2 reports
the D, pD, and DIC score for the four reference models and the proposed three-level
hierarchical generalized linear model. For all the models, our results are based on
three parallel MCMC sampling chains of 10,000 iterations each, following a 50,000-
iteration burin-in period.
I begin with a simple generalized linear model (Model I), which in turn has a
large total DIC score, mainly contributed by poor fit of the model. In Model II,
the model is extended to a two-level model: item level (M0 accounts, M1 accounts
and M2+ accounts) latent traits are explained by cardholders’ credit worthiness at
a time point in level-1 model; and in turn cardholders’ credit worthiness at a time
5In Table 3.2 we omit subscription i, j, k for the sake of brevity.
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Table 3.2: Model Selection for the Credit Card Accounts Data
Model Model Specification 5 D PD DIC
Model I
- Level 1 y∗ = β0 + β1CMX12 + β2UE + β3MOB + ǫ
∗
- Level 2 N.A.
- Level 3 N.A. 1464.26 4.90 1469.2
Model II
- Level 1 y∗ = β0 + β1θ + ǫ
∗
- Level 2 θ = u0 + u1CMX12 + u2UE + u3MOB + ǫθ
- Level 3 N.A. 671.01 342.13 1013.14
Model III
- Level 1 y∗ = β0 + β1θ + ǫ
∗
- Level 2 θ = u0 + u1CMX12 + u2UE + u3MOB + ǫθ
ǫθ ∼ AR(1)
- Level 3 N.A. 843.84 217.74 1061.58
Model IV
- Level 1 y∗ = β0 + β1θ + ǫ+ ǫ
∗
- Level 2 θ = u0 + u1CMX12 + u2UE + ǫθ
ǫθ ∼ AR(1)
- Level 3 u = v0 + v1MOB 310.03 292.70 602.74
Model V
- Level 1 y∗ = β0 + β1 ∗ θ + ǫ+ ǫ∗
- Level 2 θ = u0 + u1 ∗ CMX12 + u2 ∗ UE + ǫθ
ǫθ ∼ AR(1)
- Level 3 u = v0 + v1 ∗MOB + ǫu
ǫu ∼MVN(0,Σu)
Σu
−1 ∼Wishart(Ω, 3) 188.63 184.48 373.11
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point is attributed to time-level KPIs cardholder-level KPIs together in level-2 model.
The model is essentially a generalized linear model with random effect coming from
cardholder-level and time-level variations. From Table 3.2, we can find that the Model
II improves model fit significantly (D drops from 1464.26 in Model I to 671.01 in Model
II) with acceptable cost on model parsimoniousness. Model III extends Model II by
incorporating autoregressive error term on level 2, which is not successful as D higher
from 671.01 in Model II to 843.84. Model IV reserves AR(1) feature but introducing
the third level structure with KPI MOB shifting from level 2 to level 3 as factor
effecting level 2 parameters. However, without level 3 error term, we can substitute
Model IV level 3 equation into level 2 equation and reach a 2-level model. Model
IV provides a very small total DIC score (602.74) in comparison to the first three
models, suggesting 3-level structure is preferred to other simpler structures. Model
V, the proposed model, is fully parameterized for 3-level structure and is shown as
most efficient model among the five (with total DIC of 373.11).
Estimation Results
The estimation results for the proposed model are presented in Table 3.3 (on the
left-hand-side under panel “Model V”). For comparison, the estimated results for the
simple linear model are also presented in the same table (on the right-hand-side under
panel “Model I”). It reports posterior mean, standard deviation and 95% confidence
interval for each parameter in the model. We use horizontal solid line to divide the
parameters for the proposed model into three sections: the first section (the top left
box) reports the item level parameters; the time level parameters and the between-
subject level parameters are reported in the middle and bottom boxes respectively.
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Note that only item level section is available for simple generalized linear model-the
Model I.
For both models, most item level parameters, αs and βs are statistically signif-
icant. However, the interpretations of these parameters are totally different in the
two models. In the simple linear model, β1, β2, β3 are risk loadings for customer level
number of months accounts delinquent in last 12 months (CMX12), unemployment
rate (UE) and months on book (MOB) ( after demeaning and scaling down), respec-
tively. The results show that higher CMX12 and UE will significantly increase the
probability of deterioration or write-off. The other variable MOB on the other hand
has no clear influence on deterioration rate and write-off rate, with mean value 0.01
and standard deviation 0.02. This is somewhat not consistent with our preliminary
observation from Table 3.1, recall that average MOB increased significantly around
economic downturn. We will discuss this in details later with our findings from the
Model V.
For Model V, β0ks and β1ks are all statistically significant, except β1,k=2. With
β1,k=1 fixed at 1, a value of 3.59 on β1,k=3 suggesting, for M2+ accounts (k = 3), prob-
ability of deterioration increases much faster when the underlying credit worthiness
of cardholder is worsen. On the other hand, the estimated value of 0.77 and standard
deviation of 0.55 for β1,k=2 implies that the chance of deterioration for M1 accounts
is not linked to cardholder latent trait as close as M0 and M2+ accounts. This could
be attributed to the collection efforts (i.e. dunning SMSs and calls which are proved
very effective for accounts in early bucket) put in by credit operations department
of the issuing bank. Unfortunately due to very restricted availability of the bank’s
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Table 3.3: Simple Generalized Linear and Multilevel Analysis for the Credit Card
Accounts Data
Model V Mean SD 2.50% 97.50% Model I Mean SD 2.50% 97.50%
αk=1,c=2 29.26 5.33 19.50 40.08 α2 2.46 0.13 2.21 2.73
αk=2,c=2 24.19 6.10 13.47 36.27 β0 -0.12 0.07 -0.25 0.02
αk=3,c=2 22.04 6.27 12.45 36.51 β1 0.23 0.14 -0.05 0.49
β0,k=2 -6.13 1.99 -10.46 -2.93 β2 0.35 0.15 0.05 0.65
β0,k=3 -10.01 4.05 -19.14 -3.05 β3 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05
β1,k=2 0.77 0.55 0.09 2.25
β1,k=3 3.59 1.16 1.44 5.72
τǫ (1/σ
2
ǫ ) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
φ 0.61 0.18 0.26 0.90
τθ (1/σ
2
θ) 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.28
v00 2.42 1.71 -1.02 5.98
v01 1.24 1.52 -2.18 4.17
v02 1.63 1.63 -1.66 4.91
v10 0.05 0.17 -0.30 0.38
v11 -0.04 0.25 -0.51 0.47
v12 -0.52 0.31 -1.21 0.03
Σu[11] 3.13 2.48 0.28 9.60
Σu[12] -0.09 2.06 -4.44 4.12
Σu[13] -0.07 2.04 -4.38 4.19
Σu[21] -0.09 2.06 -4.44 4.12
Σu[22] 4.16 3.37 0.34 12.78
Σu[23] 2.01 2.62 -1.75 8.54
Σu[31] -0.07 2.04 -4.38 4.19
Σu[32] 2.01 2.62 -1.75 8.54
Σu[33] 4.14 3.30 0.36 12.68
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data, the collection productivity data is not factored in the model, which surely be
an interesting area of extension for the proposed model in this study.
The precision parameter τǫ is 0.01, which is very low and suggests a high σ
2
ǫ that
represents variations from random effects. Low precision parameter on item level
indicates that the cardholder latent trait estimated based on only two explanatory
variables (CMX12 and UE) are not sufficient to represent cardholders’ risk levels.
This can definitely be improved by adding more key performance indicators into the
model. However, for this very new attempt on hierarchical generalized linear credit
risk model, we focus more on the benefits brought by the model structural advantages.
In the time level model, autoregressive parameter φ is estimated as 0.61 with
standard deviation 0.18. It appears that a cardholder’s latent creditworthiness θij
is related to two characteristics driving the cardholder’s longitudinal data pattern,
namely the last-period latent trait θi,j−1 and the rate of deterioration on time-level
KPIs CMX12 and UE. To see this clearly, we can take expectation on and rewrite
equation (3.7) and (3.9) into
E(θij) = φθi,j−1 + u0i(1− φ) + u1i(CMX12ij − φCMX12i,j−1)
+ u2i(UEj − φUEj−1). (3.21)
This finding provides an empirical support to the pattern of straight rollers that has
long been observed by risk analysts in the area of consumer credit risk. This pattern
depicts a situation where credit accounts newly flow into delinquency and deteriorate
with increasing speed towards write-off, which contributes a high proportion of card
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issuers’ total credit losses.
Similar to variance of random effects σ2ǫ in item level equation, σ
2
θ is very high
as reflected by a small value of 0.08 on precision parameter τθ. We interpret it as
that unknown between-cardholder level KPIs excluded from time level mean equation
enter into the error term. Note that very limited KPIs are available, we are confident
that our model, with wider selection of KPIs, can perform even better in terms of
model fit.
For between-cardholder level parameters υ, all parameters except υ12 are statis-
tically insignificant. As introduced in equation (3.11), between-cardholder model is
specified as
u0i = υ00 + υ10MOBi + ǫu0i
u1i = υ01 + υ11MOBi + ǫu1i
u2i = υ02 + υ12MOBi + ǫu2i (3.22)
Parameter υ12 is estimated as -0.52 with standard deviation 0.31, suggesting high
value of MOB suppress u2i, which is in turn the regression coefficient of risk factor
UEj in equation (3.7). To highlight the importance of υ12, we discuss the estimated
posterior results of two cardholders (55 and 111) at 2003 Q3 in the following para-
graphs.
6In Table 3.4 variables CMX12, UE and MOB are reported without demeaning and scaling
though I did so in actual estimation.
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of Cardholder 55 and 111
Variables 6 Cardholder 55 Cardholder 111





To investigate the actual effect of υ12 on u2i, the posterior densities of u1 and u2
for cardholder 55 and 111 are plotted. The posterior densities of u1, coefficients for
CMX12ij in time level model, have similar mean except the density plot for card-
holder 111 (MOB = 9) is with fatter tail. This suggests credit worthiness changes
along with CMX12ij to almost same extent, irrespective of cardholders’ MOB. On
the other hand, for u2 the density plot of cardholder 111 shifts towards right as com-
pared to cardholder 55. In addition the density plot for the cardholder 111 apparently
skews to right while the cardholder 55 has a almost symmetric curve. The finding
says that the cardholders with high MOB are more robust to social and economic
shocks like high unemployment rate, whereas length of vintage is not able to help
distinguish bad/good cardholder based on past 12-month performance.
Our findings can be used to demonstrate the advantage of hierarchical credit
risk model over the conventional linear models. Upper panel of Figure 3.5 plots the
posterior sampling of Prob(yijk = 2) and Prob(yijk = 3) from Model V for both
cardholder 55 and 111. We can find that Model V assigns very high probability to
yijk = 2 for cardholder 55, but evaluate the highest probability for yijk = 3 rather than
yijk = 2 for cardholder 111. For comparison, the estimated posterior probabilities for
both Model V and Model I are reported in the lower panel of Figure 3.5. It is clearly
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Figure 3.4: Posteriors densities of u1 and u2 for cardholder 55 and 111
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Estimated Postiers Probabilities for M2+ accounts of Cardholders 55, 111 at 2003 Q3 (Model V vs Model I)
Postiers Sampling of Probabilities for M2+ accounts of Cardholders 55, 111 at 2003 Q3 from Model V
Model V  Mean SD 2.50% 97.50% Model I  Mean SD 2.50% 97.50%
P(y_ijk=1) for 55 5.6% 0.16 0.00 0.63 P(y_ijk=1) for 55 41.2% 0.04 0.33 0.50
P(y_ijk=2) for 55 90.6% 0.19 0.25 1.00 P(y_ijk=2) for 55 47.7% 0.03 0.41 0.54
P(y_ijk=3) for 55 3.8% 0.13 0.00 0.51 P(y_ijk=3) for 55 11.1% 0.02 0.07 0.16
P(y_ijk=1) for 111 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 P(y_ijk=1) for 111 42.3% 0.05 0.33 0.52
P(y_ijk=2) for 111 4.7% 0.15 0.00 0.60 P(y_ijk=2) for 111 47.1% 0.03 0.40 0.54
P(y_ijk=3) for 111 95.3% 0.15 0.40 1.00 P(y_ijk=3) for 111 10.7% 0.02 0.07 0.16
Model V : Prob( y_ijk = 2 ) for 55
Model V : Prob( y_ijk = 3 ) for 55
Model V : Prob( y_ijk = 2 ) for 111
Model V : Prob( y_ijk = 3 ) for 111
Figure 3.5: Posteriors Probabilities of cardholder 55 and 111 at 2003 Q3 responding
to M2+ accounts
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R0[3,2] chains 1:3 sample: 6000
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Figure 3.6: Posterior density of parameter Σu[23]
shown that Model I failed to recognize cardholder 111 as a high-risk customer and
cannot differentiate him from cardholders with longer relationship with the bank, as
Model I assigned almost identical probabilities to both cardholders. The failure is
expected as we have seen β3 of Model I in Table 3.3 is not statistically different from
0. However, Model V successfully separate cardholder 111 out by tagging him with
a high chance of write-off (Prob(yijk = 3) = 95.3%).
Covariance matrix Σu of Model V are reported in 3.3 as well. Interestingly I find
that Σu[23] is asymmetric and skewed to positive values, as shown in Figure 3.6.
We can interpret this as a sign of positive correlation of regression coefficients u1
and u2. This finding is consistent with intuition as in that cardholder with personal
financial issue already are those more vulnerable to social and economic shocks. The
asymmetry of the posteriors in the figure also suggests that the traditional statistical
inference based on asymptotic normality and approximate standard errors may not
be very accurate.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a general credit risk model that can be applied to
complex data structure like hierarchical and longitudinal data. In consumer credit risk
management area, hierarchical structure is a natural way of organizing and presenting
credit card account information, however to the best of my knowledge no research has
been done to introduce the hierarchical model into credit risk area though such models
are popular in educational and biomedical studies. The paper provides opportunities
to relook at credit risk model from an innovative perspective.
Although with many restrictions in data availability and usage, the proposed
model outperforms four reference models with incremental complexity, starting from
conventional linear ordinal logit model. Especially, the proposed model manifestly
revealed the disadvantages of traditional credit risk models that do not properly
account for (1) hierarchical structures of latent trait and explanatory variables; (2)
multiple layers of associations between observations; and (3) random effects and fixed
effects within models.
With Bayesion MCMC estimation approach, more complicated model can be fit
without huge difficulties faced by traditional maximum likelihood method. Thus
extension of the proposed model can be easily carried out to account for new scenarios.
For example, one of the possible extension is to jointly model longitudinal data and
survival data as discussed by Guo and Carline (2004) for AIDS clinical trial comparing
two different treatments. This can also be introduced into credit risk model area,
given the similarity in the data features. Moreover, the model can be extended to
incorporate seasonality in economic data and extreme movement of financial data.
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As a summary, the thesis is an attempt to model real credit card data taking into
accounts of unique characteristics of consumer credit risk. In this thesis, we accom-
plish the following achievements: 1) It introduces credit card issuing banks’ business
concepts into credit risk modeling, such that credit risk models are accordant with
consumer credit risk characteristics; 2) It highlights that without proper assumptions
on the various correlations root in data structures, credit risk models may be less
relevant and sometimes misleading; 3) This thesis demonstrates the advantages of
the proposed modeling concepts through three implementations using data sample
from real credit card portfolios. This thesis exists as one of very few new attempts to
push modeling techniques advance in the area of consumer credit risk in recent years.
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Appendix A
Terminology and Abbreviations
Some important terms and abbreviations that are used in the thesis are presented as
below.
Abbreviation Full Term Description
N.A. Bucket A compartment that is identified by a delinquency (past due) stage (for example, 1 to 29
days past due, 30 to 59 days past due, and so forth).
DPD Days past
due




A banking indulstry jargon term of key metrics that measure performance. In the thesis,
KPIs represent characteristics of credit card accounts that are input in credit risk model as
source of predicative power.
PrD Probability
of default
The probability of default is the likelihood that a loan will not be repaid and will fall into
default.
N.A. Roll forward The activity of a account moving into the next delinquency bucket
N.A. Roll-forward
rate
The rate at which accounts ”roll” from one bucket to the next bucket. For example, if one in




This is an accounting practice that refers to writing the debt off the banks books and
reporting it as a loss. Write-off usually happens at 180 days past due.
CWO Contractual
write-off





Write off debt of a credit card account before it reaches 180 days past due.
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